Benji Shulman
– September 15, 2025
7 min read

The Far View by Benji Shulman
The discerning readers of The Common Sense are no doubt familiar with the concept of an “Easter egg.” A phenomenon that began in video games and later spread to film and television, it refers to hidden messages or secret details creators embed for fans to discover. Easter eggs often illuminate aspects of a story or offer insights that are not obvious at first glance. For example, in The Godfather series, oranges appear onscreen before a major character’s death. Some Easter eggs are immediately apparent, while others remain hidden for years, but either way they often become talking points amongst fans that help enrich the experience of the film.
Now, this is a foreign policy column, so what’s with pop culture references? Well, because much like movies, South Africa’s foreign relations also have their own Easter eggs that are worth interrogating. Imagine for a moment that our country’s relationship with Iran was a binge-worthy Netflix series, a suspenseful, political, and at times horror-tinged show we will call Tuinhuise and Tehran.
In the early episodes we would meet a Shah who was far from benevolent but still relatively moderate. Focused on economic prosperity, he sold his country’s oil to a racist regime in Africa, defying global condemnation. But in 1979 the Shah was toppled by a revolution, itself soon hijacked by Shi’ite Islamists bent on opposing and destroying all forms of imperialism. These new rulers raged at the “Great Satan” of America and the “Little Satan” of Israel, cutting off oil supplies to the racist country and funding the African liberation opposition movement, the ANC, instead.
Yet not everything went to plan. Invaded by a hostile Arab neighbour, Iran’s new rulers quietly put aside their revolutionary ideals and began trading oil for weapons with the same racist African regime they had just denounced. Of course, they did not inform the ANC of this change and publicly they kept proclaiming their war on imperialist societies with their over-educated, underdressed women and religious freedoms.
Fast forward a few seasons and the ANC takes power. Grateful, they build ties with their former patrons, sending delegations from the president’s residence in Tuinhuise to Tehran. But the mullahs have problems of their own. Repression against the population, a clandestine nuclear weapons program, and their role as the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism make them pariahs abroad and unpopular at home. To shore up legitimacy they needed friends, and South Africa’s governing party obliged, offering high-level visits, support for military exercises, hospitality for Iran-backed groups like Hamas, and protective votes at the UN.
Binge this series long enough though and you start noticing plot holes. Trade between Tuinhuise and Tehran is actually minimal and Iran does not crack South Africa’s top 30 trading partners (even Israel ranks higher). South Africa is a liberal democracy with free elections and human rights; there are no shared values. Moreover, the relationship is costly. Major powers view Iran as a security threat and don’t appreciate South Africa carrying water for the regime. In other words, South Africa gains little but spends a great deal of political capital to keep this relationship alive. Why?
Here is where the Easter eggs come in. Nearly a decade after the ANC took power, telecom giant MTN entered Iran, muscling out rival Turkcell for a mobile licence. Turkcell alleges this was done illegally, involving bribery and diplomatic favours related to Iran’s nuclear program. Their claim is based on a whistle-blower and some 7,000 documents handed to investigators. MTN denies the allegations. The chairman of MTN at the time was today’s President Cyril Ramaphosa.
When this Easter egg first surfaced it drew little attention, a subplot in the broader drama of South African corruption. But if true, the combination of money could help explain why the ANC has made Iran a central pillar of its foreign policy.
But now the viewers are starting to notice the Easter eggs. After a decade of trying, Turkcell may soon get its day in a South African court, as a decision on a jurisdictional matter is imminent. Another group is suing MTN in US courts, alleging it helped Iran bypass American sanctions for technologies used to kill US soldiers. The US Department of Justice is also investigating MTN’s role with the Iranian regime. And South Africa’s presence on the financial “grey list” stems partly from Iranian money flows.
These Easter eggs help to show that South Africa’s foreign policy in Iran and other places may be shaped more by money and ideology than by national interest, and certainly not by human rights. As these cases unfold, they could reveal a great deal previously unnoticed about how South Africa has conducted itself abroad. Depending on how the Easter eggs crack, they could end up overshadowing the series itself.