Pierneef
– October 13, 2025
4 min read

It is a striking feature of South Africa’s current predicament that, even in the face of mounting evidence of crisis, the ruling party does not act to prevent its own decline. The latest case study related to South Africa’s main ports that have become notorious for inefficiency.
In late September The Common Sense reported that: “The World Bank’s latest Container Port Performance Index, produced with S&P Global, placed Durban dead last at 403rd out of 403 ports surveyed in 2024, while Cape Town ranked 400th. Coega and Port Elizabeth also featured in the bottom ten, underlining the scale of inefficiency gripping the country’s maritime gateways.”
The human cost of allowing this kind of situation to develop is vast. As trade and investment shrink, job creation has stagnated. At over 30% South Africa’s unemployment rate remains among the highest in the world (the global rate is nearer 5%). For millions, that statistic translates into daily hardship and declining hope for the future. Literally with every missed shipment and each day of cargo congestion, economic prospects narrow further and not just for exporters, but for every worker and family reliant on South Africa’s ability to compete.
As the ports fail, the public’s patience with the ruling party erodes. Where once economic growth and infrastructure investment underpinned broad electoral support, now stagnation and crisis have left the party exposed to mounting criticism and voter disillusionment.
Last year saw the African National Congress (ANC) vote share slip to just 40%. This year it has polled as low at 33%. In Gauteng and Johannesburg it now lags the Democratic Alliance by some way.
Despite all this, reformist action from the ANC remains elusive. Other countries facing similar challenges have responded with urgency by opening up ports to private capital, investing in modern technology, and putting professional management ahead of political patronage. By contrast, South Africa has moved very slowly towards concessioning ports with the ANC terrified that its dreams of state control will be sacrificed if private actors with the requisite expertise are allowed to fix the ports.
Why the reluctance? The answer lies in a mix of 1950s Soviet rigidity, internal party battles, corruption, and a deep aversion to ceding control.
But whatever the cause, the consequence is the same. With every year of inaction, the opportunity to reset the country’s economic course grows smaller and with it the ANC’s vote share. The party’s own future is now tied in great measure to its willingness to rescue the ports and the wider economy from the grip of decay. To date, in as far as it has made any choice, it has chosen diminishing support over reform and seems determined not to alter that course.