For most of the last 30 years, South African foreign policy has been just that: foreign. Coming out of apartheid, the country was the darling of the international community. As the regional military and economic hegemon, it faced no serious local challengers. This allowed South Africa to chart its own course in foreign policy largely unhindered, while the general population focused on other pressing issues such as crime, health, education, and the economy.

Out of this environment, the Department of International Relations and Co-operation (DIRCO) developed a set of pillars for South Africa’s foreign policy. These include: development and upliftment of South Africa’s people; stability of the Republic and the constitutional order; growth and development of the South African economy; and a stable and prosperous African continent.

In other words, what the people who run this newspaper might call common sense.

In the early years, such a common-sense approach to foreign affairs delivered notable wins for the country. South Africa secured a rotating seat on the UN Security Council, hosted major international policy gatherings such as the World Summit on Sustainable Development, and played a central role in reforming moribund African governance structures.

It was instrumental in brokering peace in a multi-country war in Central Africa, concluded trade deals with the European Union and the United States, and sought new trading partners across the developing world to expand market access for South African businesses.

Boosted

These efforts boosted our standing in the world and brought home some unconventional successes, including hosting the FIFA World Cup and winning the bid for the Square Kilometre Array. There were, of course, critics, and not every initiative was a complete success. But the point is that officials were making a deliberate effort to ensure foreign policy served the people of the country.

There was, however, another side to South African foreign policy. Included in DIRCO’s stated pillars is also the pursuit of a “just and equitable world order.” This sounds reasonable enough, especially as South Africa owes part of its freedom to international support. But what does “just and equitable” actually mean in practice?

According to DIRCO, it includes “South-South cooperation and opposition to colonialism and neo-colonialism in all its forms.” In practice, this has meant incorporating the ANC’s ideological politics into South Africa’s defined national interest.

Over time, this has shaped decisions that place the party’s worldview ahead of the country’s broader values and needs, contributing to the diplomatic predicament we face today.

Some of these decisions were relatively minor: a questionable vote at the UN in support of Syria here, a denial of a visa to the Dalai Lama there. Others were more serious: hosting the antisemitic Durban Racism Conference or conducting military exercises with undemocratic regimes. Sometimes, the consequences were felt directly at home.

Stolen election

For example, in the 2000s, when Zimbabwe’s ZANU-PF, an historic ANC ally, stole an election, South Africa moved to protect the regime from international censure. This helped cement Zimbabwe’s decline, depriving the SADC region of a potential economic anchor. Instead, we ended up with a collapsed neighbour, an exodus of skilled professionals, and a migrant crisis.

In international relations, countries sometimes need to balance values with economic or security interests. For instance, South Africa shares few political values with the authoritarian People’s Republic of China, but given China’s position as the world’s second-largest economy, engagement is unavoidable.

The same logic does not apply to the host of small, undemocratic regimes with which we maintain close ties despite having negligible economic or strategic benefit. Cuba, Venezuela, North Korea, Iran, and Russia all fall into this category. Yet South Africa continues to spend considerable political capital defending or aligning with them. This is the result of ANC-driven foreign policy often placing ideological loyalty above the interests of South African citizens.

The rest of the world has begun to take note. The United States Congress is drafting legislation to sanction South African officials over corruption and activities perceived as threatening to US security interests. Other democracies are following suit.

Angered

Israel is angered by South Africa’s support for extremist groups such as Hamas, which is holding Israeli citizens hostage. Taiwan has threatened to restrict access to its critical semiconductor industry after South Africa downgraded its diplomatic representation in Tshwane.

Even regionally, South Africa’s influence has waned. We can no longer effectively address Rwandan-backed rebels in the DRC or Islamist insurgents terrorising northern Mozambique.

Foreign policy can no longer be treated as what commentator Rob Henderson calls a “luxury belief,” meaning an elite idea implemented at the expense of ordinary people. As more South Africans, including readers of The Common Sense, begin to scrutinise foreign policy, this new regular column will explore the ideas and events that shape it.

Together, perhaps we can figure out how to make foreign policy work for the people rather than for the cadres.