South Africa needs an anti-corruption agency that is independent, well resourced, and embedded in a wider system of accountability. The aim is not symbolism but outcomes that restore the rule of law, improve services, and earn back public confidence.

Robert Klitgaard, author of Controlling Corruption from University of California Press, wrote that book “to help readers analyze corrupt behavior and decide what to do about it”. His starting point is precise. “Corruption exists when an individual illicitly puts personal interests above those of the people and ideals he or she is pledged to serve”.

From this definition flows a task design grounded in his stylized equation “CORRUPTION = MONOPOLY + DISCRETION - ACCOUNTABILITY”.

A credible agency must therefore do three things.

First, narrow monopoly and discretion by re-engineering processes, opening competitive channels, and simplifying rules so that decisions are reviewable. Klitgaard’s policy menu explicitly includes “selecting agents, changing rewards and penalties, gathering information, restructuring the principal-agent-client relationship, and changing attitudes about corruption.”

Second, harden information flows. That means asset declarations, lifestyle audits that bite, hotlines with anonymity guarantees, and strong data-sharing with tax and procurement systems. Klitgaard notes that some jurisdictions even “shift the burden of proof to the agent to show she is not guilty,” while warning about costs and safeguards required for such measures.

Third, protect the agency’s independence. Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau illustrates the point. Legal powers to obtain financial records, routine cross-checks, and a reputation so strong that “the mention of the CPIB’s investigating an officer is said to cause fear and trembling,” backed by a track record of pursuing both “big fish” and petty bribe-takers.

South Africa’s context shows why these design choices matter. South African Police Service (SAPS) capacity has been hollowed out and trust is low. Reservists collapsed from 52 054 in 2011/12 to 3 502 in 2023, a 93% reduction, while leadership churn and integrity failures have impaired the SAPS’s effectiveness. When everyday law enforcement struggles to deter and detect, grand corruption thrives and service delivery falters. In that environment, a specialist integrity body must not duplicate weak functions. It must compensate for them.

A practical blueprint follows.

Legal mandate and independence. Create the agency by statute with exclusive jurisdiction over significant public-sector graft, independent appointment and removal processes, and a multi-year budget appropriation insulated from executive interference.

Talent and incentives. Recruit on integrity and competence, use vetting and conflict-of-interest rules, pay to retain scarce skills, and rotate sensitive posts to reduce capture. Klitgaard’s warning applies to staffing too. In the public service, “it was assumed too readily that clever people would also be moral people”.

Intelligence-led enforcement. Fuse procurement, tax, asset registry, and banking data for red flags. Use whistleblower channels, media signals, and third-party information to overcome asymmetries.

Visible, even-handed prosecutions. Early cases should include high-profile office-bearers and complex tender schemes. Results must be public, consistent, and resistant to appeal to build a reputation effect akin to Singapore’s.

System, not silo. The agency should co-design process fixes with Treasury, SARS, procurement authorities, and auditors so that monopoly and discretion shrink and accountability rises across the state, not only in courtrooms.

South Africans have paid a steep price for impunity. A strong, independent watchdog, embedded in a wider accountability architecture, can reverse the incentives that drive graft and help restore faith that public power serves the public again.