Is the rogue-GNU winning against the GNU? The rogue-GNU is the GNU that the ANC, MK, EFF and ASA have created in Gauteng as an alternative to the ANC/DA coalition that exists at the national level. The two GNUs have been in conflict since June 2024 and the rogue variant has thus far succeeded in wrangling the province and the cities of Johannesburg and Pretoria out of the national GNU’s hands.

The move this month to suspend Johann Mettler as Pretoria’s city manager is the firmest indication yet that the rogue-GNU may be winning the overall upper hand. Mettler is a good man and, since being appointed to the city in 2022 under the DA’s leadership, had made great progress in cleaning up the corruption he found there. That made a lot of people nervous, and a three-step plan was hatched to sink him. Part one was to get the DA out of the city government, which the ANC, EFF, and ActionSA achieved in 2022. Part two was to contrive a series of trumped-up allegations against Mettler, which were tabled by the EFF on behalf of its two partners. Part three was to use those allegations to suspend Mettler, which the rogue-GNU did last week.

Where does the ANC stand on all this?

The B-team analysts would have you believe that Cyril Ramaphosa and many in his camp of the ANC are opposed to the rogue-GNU but powerless to stop it. That is wrong. He could squash it like a bug in less than an afternoon if he chose to. Instead, the ANC’s strategy is intentionally duplicitous. The party plays an active part in building up both GNUs and in sabotaging both GNUs. The idea is that by playing them against each other, and thereby defining the future of the country as the outcome of the struggle for power between them, Luthuli House preserves its position as the centre of political power in South Africa. Put differently, no other party is in both GNUs. If the ANC retains enough influence to determine the trajectory of either formation, it holds by default the centre of power in South Africa and mitigates the risk of losing control of the country, should one or the other GNU ultimately prevail.

It is all classic Ramaphosa. Find the exact middle ground between two mutually annihilating objectives and occupy that position. Raise minimum wages and introduce a subsidy to promote youth employment. Pursue the expropriation of all fixed and movable assets and encourage investment. Ally South Africa with Iran, spy on US security infrastructure on behalf of who knows which depraved dictatorship, and then feign interest in a US reset.

Could the rogue-GNU flip the national GNU? Yes, especially if Paul Mashatile succeeds Ramaphosa as leader of the ANC. But as long as Ramaphosa remains in command, the strategy will likely remain one of occupying the middle ground between them in the hope that neither succeeds.

What would happen if the national GNU were flipped? A lot would depend on how that happened. But there can be little doubt that for its core partners the objective in doing so would be to loot the state. That may not be the worst thing that could happen. The worst thing would be an ideological takeover intended to reorder South Africa’s economy and society along harder leftist lines. Ideology cannot be reasoned with. Corruption, to a greater extent, can. The long-term objective of the corruptest elements within the ANC has been to create a model of “sustainable wealth extraction” (this exact phrasing has been used). For that, you need some measure of fiscal and economic prudence and some degree of economic growth.

But the sentiment shock of a GNU flip would see the rand come off, and the bond market too. South Africa’s debt position would worsen, and the odds of convincing London bankers that this might be the least-worst option would be limited.

This is why it is so important to be suitably hedged on the country. Mr Ramaphosa, in hedging in every conceivable direction, from the GNU to the rogue-GNU domestically and from Iran to America globally, offers some good advice. In environments of complete uncertainty, strategy becomes easy. It is complete diversification.

For the ordinary South African, without the personal power to determine events as Mr Ramaphosa might if he were not as he is, the strategy must be diversification, and specifically across four terrains. The first is across your money and assets. The second is across your career and income streams. The third is your children and their options, both in the country and abroad. The fourth is your geography.

The objective must be, as the ANC is doing with the GNUs, to create as many choices and options as possible so that whichever way it goes, you’ll be good. The more choices and options you have across the four areas listed above, the stronger your strategic position becomes.

The strongest position would therefore be something approximating this:

Your money is invested across asset classes and currencies in a manner that ensures that, if SA Inc. crashes, your net position improves, while if South Africa becomes a great success, you are very prosperous within the country. Your career or business is of a nature that allows it to succeed regardless of what happens in the Union Buildings. It does not depend on the government or large corporations to thrive. Even better if it is globally transferable and you can work for global clients from within South Africa. Your children have attended the best schools and have the option to study or work abroad because their skills and that option are the only things South Africa’s government cannot expropriate. Lastly, you have the option to reside in an expertly organised and increasingly private community where everything, from the water to the power supply, is in the hands of a group who know what they are doing, and where security is run by private experts committed to your safety.

Lastly – a private note to our dear friends who, because they are good and decent people, think otherwise. Mr Ramaphosa has since December 2017 been in an immensely powerful position. Things are the way they are because he allows them to be so. Just as he allowed the ANC to fall to 40% – which was completely unnecessary. There are no domestic third forces with more power than he has who are holding back reform. Castro warned the ANC on this. He is holding it back.