If Patrice Motsepe Does Take Over the ANC, What Could Happen Next?

Pierneef

February 20, 2026

6 min read

The answer to the question of what a Motsepe presidency might mean for South Africa lies first in the assumptions that underpin his presidency and then in the execution risk around those assumptions.
If Patrice Motsepe Does Take Over the ANC, What Could Happen Next?
Photo by Jemal Countess/Getty Images for Global Citizen Festival: Mandela 100

A leadership transition within the African National Congress (ANC) to Patrice Motsepe would constitute a structural political shift rather than a routine succession event. Understanding the implications at this early stage requires some assumptions.

Assume first that the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) secures roughly half of its 2024 national support in the next election in 2029 (the EFF has seen support slumping and suffers from internal management problems). Assume the same for the uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MK), with its support halving as protest momentum dissipates and organisational weaknesses become more apparent. Both events would release a bloc of chiefly former ANC supporters back into the competitive space.

Assume second that the growth of the Democratic Alliance (DA) stalls as the doomsday prophecy fades in public opinion and the DA delivery brand is tarnished by its Government of National Unity performance and the difficulty it may experience after the next local government elections in securing visible improvements in the cities and towns it may come to govern. As a consequence, assume 10% of its current voters defect toward a Motsepe-led ANC — both the kind of elite middle-class voters that backed the CR17 campaign idea and aspirant middle-class voters that had bled from the ANC.

Assume third that a Motsepe administration implements limited economic reforms. These include improved messaging on security of property rights, a predictable investment regime for inbound capital, accelerated private management of port and rail infrastructure, reformed mining policy, and pragmatic trade positioning with both the United States and China. Under these conditions, fixed investment rises sustainably above 20% of GDP. Real GDP growth shifts from the current 1.5% drift toward a 3%-plus range.

Any analyst can change any of these assumptions, and doing so changes the outcome, but for the sake of argument, assume they all hold.

Under those assumptions, South Africa changes as follows.

The first is a consolidation of the centre. With both the EFF and MK reduced and the DA leaking a portion of its voters, the ANC’s vote share could move back toward the high 40 percentiles and potentially cross the 50% threshold. This would not necessarily represent a return to dominant party status, but it would restore a sense of authority to the Union Buildings.

The second is that economic feedback will quickly translate into political support for the governing administration. South African electoral behaviour is motivated primarily by material conditions. Improvements in employment, visible infrastructure delivery, and macroeconomic stability will reduce support for political alternatives to the ANC.

The third thing that will change is the internal stability of the ANC. A leadership anchored in credibility will alter the internal balance of power. Reformist factions will gain leverage if growth and revenue performance improve, especially as these begin to translate into visible political gains.

The primary variable in this equation is execution risk.

If reform measures are symbolic rather than structural, or are undermined by factionalism, infighting, internal power struggles, or the pressure of delivering on concessions made to internal ANC power brokers, then initial support gains would erode quickly. In that event, South Africa will go through a further period of reduced investor confidence and lower investment and growth, internal stability will come under growing pressure, and demand for political alternatives (radical and centrist) will increase.

However, if reforms are implemented in a manner that produces measurable improvements in investment, growth, and employment, South Africa may stabilise into its Pretoria-centric governance model far faster than many analysts may think possible.

Pierneef was one of South Africa's greatest artists, known for his paintings of South African vistas. This column named after him aims to do something similar - sketch the broad vistas of South Africa's domestic landscape.

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