The Iran war has culminated in a fragile and uncertain ceasefire, with negotiations expected to kick into high gear this weekend.

Much of the early Western reaction has assumed that these talks will follow a familiar diplomatic script, moving toward de-escalation and settlement. That assumption could prove flawed. Critical to understanding the potential outcomes, especially for Western observers, is recognising that the Western approach to negotiation is not shared by key rivals such as Iran. Understanding that non-Western actors see negotiation as an entirely different concept to how Westerners regard it will be important to anticipating Iran’s next moves, and therefore to assessing whether this ceasefire represents the beginning of a settlement, or merely a pause in a continuing conflict.

The emerging ceasefire talks between Iran and the United States (US) are being read in Western capitals and markets as an effort to end the conflict and, on the part of the US, they most likely are that. But it would be wrong to assume that Iran sees the purpose of the talks in the same way as the US does. Understanding why that is so requires appreciating the difference in how Western liberal societies and revolutionary regimes regard the purpose of negotiations, something barely understood in much of North America and Western Europe.

The first difference lies in how the two sides see the primary goal of talks. In the Western liberal approach, the objective is to resolve conflict and reach agreement. Negotiation is meant to close disputes and produce a stable settlement. In a revolutionary framework, the goal is to consolidate power and advance the broader struggle. Talks are not designed to end the conflict, but to move it forward under more favourable conditions. Talks do not mean that warfare has ended – rather that it continues, just on a different plane.

The second difference is how each side views its adversary. Western negotiators tend to treat the other party as a partner in a problem-solving exercise, someone with whom a “win-win” outcome can be constructed. The emphasis is on shared interests and mutual benefit. In a revolutionary model, the adversary is an enemy to be neutralised or replaced. Engagement is tactical, not co-operative, and is aimed at weakening the opponent over time, rather than building a durable partnership.

The third difference concerns the role of compromise. In the Western tradition, compromise is central. It is the mechanism through which agreement is reached, often understood as a fair balancing, or “splitting of the difference”, between competing positions. In a revolutionary approach, compromise is only ever a tactical concession to create a future battlefield advantage. Concessions are made only where they serve that objective.

The fourth difference is the metric of success. For Western negotiators, success is defined by the creation of a stable, legally binding agreement that reduces uncertainty, and locks in peace. For a revolutionary actor, success is measured by whether the process has shifted the balance of forces sufficiently in its favour where future warfare wins might be earned. The question is not whether the conflict has been resolved, but whether an improved strategic position from which to harm the enemy has been gained.

These four differences are set out in the table below:

The Western inclination towards compromise and peace-making, and the belief that common ground and “win-win” outcomes can achieve that has, in the absence of a willingness to bring credible hard-power consequences forward fast where talks falter, become a structural weakness in its geostrategy and diplomatic thinking of the past 40 years. (Chinese, Russian, and similarly schooled readers will smile wryly.) That weakness is compounded by pressure from sections of Western think tanks, media, and commentary that consistently push for exactly that approach – committing the critical analytical error of thinking that the West’s rivals see and think about the world exactly as the West does. They do not.

The practical antidote to the risk in this is straightforward in that negotiation must be underpinned by a credible willingness to bring hard power forward, quickly and decisively, if talks falter. America’s credible willingness to bomb Iranian energy and transport infrastructure, and the uncouth terms in which this was communicated, are what opened the window for talks in the first place, and the success of those talks will hinge as much as anything on retaining that willingness on a hair trigger.