On Friday, diplomats in New York discussed Sudan and South Sudan as separate items on their agenda. But in Abyei, the disputed, oil-rich territory between the two countries, families are still mourning those killed in a drone strike four days earlier. For them, the distinction must seem meaningless.

The strike devastated Amiet Market. The United Nations (UN) is still verifying the death toll, although local authorities reported at least 153 people killed. Reuters reported on the market’s alleged role in a fuel supply network serving Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group fighting the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) for control of Sudan. Diplomats and analysts describe fuel moving through South Sudan and Abyei before reaching RSF fighters. South Sudan’s government said the circumstances of the attack, including any connection to the RSF, had not been established. Whatever the intended target, civilians were killed.

Also on Friday, the UN Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) held their annual consultations in New York. South Africa was among the AU members expected to help lead discussions about South Sudan, although not the separate discussion about Sudan.

There’s a further South African connection. President Cyril Ramaphosa chairs the AU’s High-Level Ad Hoc Committee on South Sudan, known as the C5, which held its latest summit in September. Our government therefore has more than a passing interest in what happens across this increasingly dangerous border.

So, what did South Africa put forward in New York?

No Public Account

As of the time of writing, neither a public account of Pretoria’s contribution to the discussions nor a final joint communiqué was readily available. That doesn't mean our representatives said nothing or that useful diplomacy wasn't taking place. Some negotiations require confidentiality.

The Security Council did issue a separate statement on Friday condemning the Abyei attack and calling for a full investigation. Meanwhile, UN human rights chief Volker Türk reported that at least 306 people had been killed by drone strikes across Sudan in the first three weeks of October.

The strikes, attributed to both the SAF and the RSF, hit homes, markets, hospitals, and sites sheltering displaced people. Hundreds more people were injured. Civilians who had already fled the fighting were being attacked in places where they had hoped to be safe.

At a United States (US) congressional briefing on Wednesday, Sudanese analyst Kholood Khair warned that the preceding 24 to 48 hours might have been among the deadliest of the war. She insisted that stopping the fighting means confronting not only Sudan’s warring factions but also the foreign governments helping to keep them supplied.

Considerable scrutiny has focused on alleged military support for the RSF from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has repeatedly denied supplying the group with weapons. Khair argued that the networks supplying the Sudanese army also deserve scrutiny. She urged Washington to have difficult conversations with allies in capitals including Ankara, Cairo, and Abu Dhabi. Her point was that investigations into the weapons killing Sudanese civilians should not depend on which armed faction fired them.

Justin Lynch, another panellist, described foreign military supply networks linked to Sudan's army, including drones reportedly supplied from Iran and Turkey, and Egypt’s importance as a logistical hub.

Uncomfortable Questions

These are uncomfortable questions for diplomats because some of the governments accused of supporting the war are also involved in efforts to end it.

Egypt and the UAE, for example, are members of the Quad alongside the US and Saudi Arabia. The group is working to secure a humanitarian truce.

That doesn’t make their involvement in peace efforts pointless. On the contrary, countries with influence over the warring parties may be essential to ending the fighting. But their influence cannot be exempt from examination simply because they are sitting at a negotiating table.

On Wednesday, representatives of governments and international organisations met in Geneva to coordinate the various peace initiatives. They called on foreign states and other actors to stop fuelling Sudan’s war through mercenaries, military equipment, particularly drones, and financial support. They also emphasised humanitarian access, de-escalation, and the need for Sudanese civilians to have a meaningful role in deciding their country’s political future. All sensible objectives. But there was no ceasefire agreement.

The problem is not a shortage of declarations. Earlier this month, the Security Council renewed the existing Sudan sanctions regime for another two months. But members failed to agree on a proposal to extend the arms embargo beyond Darfur to the whole country, despite the spread of drone warfare and attacks on civilians.

This tells us something about the limits of international agreements. Governments can condemn the consequences of a war while disagreeing about measures intended to restrict the weapons sustaining it.

And that brings the focus back to South Africa.

Cannot Force Negotiations

Pretoria cannot force Sudan’s military leaders to negotiate, nor can it compel foreign governments to change their policies. But it does have diplomatic relationships, a seat on the AU Peace and Security Council and a government that consistently argues for African-led solutions to African conflicts.

Earlier this week, during talks with Uganda in Pretoria, International Relations and Cooperation Minister Ronald Lamola called for civilian protection, humanitarian access, and political dialogue in Sudan.

These are worthwhile priorities. But what is South Africa doing to put them into practice?

Given South Africa’s particular diplomatic responsibilities in South Sudan, the reported movement of fuel through the country to Sudan’s RSF raises questions Pretoria cannot easily ignore. If those supply routes are operating as described, South Africa should be using its diplomatic position to address the connections between the two conflicts, rather than treating them as separate problems.

South Africa could use its AU role to press for better cooperation in identifying cross-border supply networks, while insisting that investigations into attacks on civilians establish the facts before responsibility is assigned.

It could support stronger monitoring of humanitarian commitments. If the SAF and RSF promise to allow aid through, who checks that convoys reach their destinations? If they agree to restrict drone attacks, who verifies compliance? And what pressure can be brought to bear when those commitments are broken?

Pretoria also says it supports a Sudanese-led transition to civilian government. It could ask how women’s organisations, professional associations, and community groups will participate in negotiations, rather than leaving Sudan’s future to be decided by the armed men who have devastated it.

South Africa doesn’t need to launch another mediation initiative. Sudan already has enough overlapping diplomatic efforts. What it needs is for existing initiatives to produce results.

After decades of reporting from war zones, one lesson stands out: diplomatic statements have a remarkable tendency to repeat themselves, even as the circumstances on the ground grow steadily worse. The promises stay the same. The death toll keeps rising.

It would be unrealistic to expect South Africa to end Sudan’s war. Countries with far greater leverage have failed to do that. But limited influence does not mean having no responsibility.

Sudan and South Sudan may occupy separate places on a diplomatic agenda. The weapons, money, and fuel sustaining the fighting don’t recognise those distinctions. South Africa’s diplomacy shouldn’t be constrained by them either.

Paula Slier is a South African global war correspondent and information warfare specialist. She is the founder of Newshound Media International and an international speaker whose work examines how narratives are shaped, contested and weaponised during conflict.