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For much of the democratic era, South Africa has been cast as a country in decline. Headlines emphasise failing municipalities, persistent unemployment, corruption scandals, and weak growth. At odds with that stands a very important body of data that shows that South Africa did, for roughly the first 15 years after 1994, demonstrate an extraordinary capacity for progress that might still be built on to set the country up for a stronger 2030s.

At odds with the doom narratives still present in much of the media, and the scathing assessment of the African National Congress (ANC) in government, South Africa’s first 15 years of democracy were not defined by collapse, but by the rapid expansion of living standards from a deeply unequal starting point. It is the interruption of progress, not the absence of it, that needs to be repaired for the country to reach its promise.

Start with the data on job creation. Despite the popular description of the early democratic period as one of jobless growth, formal employment expanded significantly. The number of formally employed South Africans rose from just under 8 million in 1994 to nearly 15 million by 2008. Today, however, 18 years after 2008, the economy has added barely 2 million jobs to that figure.

Service delivery shows the same pattern. Between 1994 and 2008, the share of households without electricity fell from just under 50% to below 20%. The number today is marginally higher than in 2008, and most other indicators reflect a similar trajectory.

Jobs and services improved because the economy performed strongly. Growth rose to around 3% after 1994, and then to between 4% and 5% in the decade between the 1998 Asian financial crisis and the departure of President Thabo Mbeki in late 2008.

That growth was underpinned by rising fixed investment, which increased from around 15% of GDP to 22% by 2008, approaching the lower end of emerging market norms. Today, however, the figure has fallen back below pre-1994 levels.

Fixed investment rose because investor confidence improved. An index tracking confidence nearly doubled between 1994 and 2008. Today, it has fallen back to pre-1994 lows.

Government debt levels were cut in half between 1994 and 2008, but have since exceeded their pre-1994 highs. The inherited budget deficit of nearly 5% of GDP was turned into a surplus 13 years later, and the resulting savings helped finance an expansive social welfare system.

As growth improved, a range of positive trends followed. The murder rate was 50% lower in 2008 than in 1994. Violent protest action declined. The middle class expanded strongly.

This was a remarkable period of progress for which neither the country nor the ANC, which led it, received sufficient credit. That matters because it shows that South Africa does not need to reinvent its policy framework from scratch. A credible blueprint already exists, especially if the relationship between confidence, growth, and job creation that defined the first 15 years after 1994 can be replicated.

It begins with restoring investor confidence and reducing the cost of committing capital. Secure property rights, and remove barriers to investment, and much of that is achieved. Then fix port and rail logistics so that mining, manufacturing, and agriculture can move goods efficiently. Private sector management offers a clear route. Third is to ensure sufficient dispatchable electricity by enabling Eskom to refit its defunct coal fleet.

These reforms, opening the door to capital, fixing logistics, and restoring power supply, should be sufficient to lift growth from the current forecast of around 1.5% to near 3% before the 2029 election. Additional trade and investment agreements with China and the United States would strengthen that outcome. From there, further reforms could push growth towards 4% or 5%.

Are these reforms plausible from a public opinion perspective? Routine B-grade analysis on South Africa says they are not, as the public would rebel, and the government is therefore in no position to drive these measures. That view is, however, entirely wrong. Years of poll-based research shows that strong majorities of South Africans would support the required labour market, empowerment, and property rights reforms, as this newspaper has published at length.

It is not, therefore, that public opinion is holding back reform and thereby the economy. Rather, it is policymakers who are at fault; their intransigence holds back reform, and hence recovery, an omission for which they have also paid arguably the most severe price – given that ANC support tracks living standards of people more closely than any other indicator.

Currently polling at around 40%, of both Social Research Foundation and Ipsos numbers, the ANC’s demise is almost entirely a self-inflicted one originating from its refusal to entertain the reforms its own members support.

There is some confidence, therefore, to a view that the ANC could see its support levels recover to upwards of 50% if it entertained the above reforms. The Economic Freedom Fighters and the uMkhonto weSizwe Party would certainly lose support under such a scenario, while the Democratic Alliance would retain its core base. Protest levels would decline.

South Africa’s trajectory is, therefore, not predetermined. The current low-growth path might persist, and downside risks remain. But the reforms needed to unlock the upside are within reach, making a stronger outcome plausible by the end of the decade.