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The African National Congress (ANC) has hit a near record low national poll* number two years after the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) with the Democratic Alliance (DA). In Johannesburg, where the party’s rebels have built an alternative GNU in practice with the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and the uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MKP), it is polling at under 20%. All this shows that the formula of the GNU matters very little relative to the economic results it achieves on the ground. And as long as those results remain an economic growth rate of near 1%, the consequence will be that South Africa breaks up into the third of the three scenarios sketched by this newspaper in its recent South Africa in 2034: The Latest Scenarios report.

The ANC has fallen to 34.0% nationally, down from nearer 40.0% earlier this year and only two percentage points above its post-2025 VAT-crisis low. The DA remains broadly stable on 27.0%, the MKP has risen to 15.0%, while the EFF remains flat on 7.0%. The key metropolitan councils also continue to point towards another round of hung administrations.

The ANC’s descent from the near 70.0% of the vote it commanded in 2004 to just half of that now is structural in the main and arises from the fact that the investment rate, and therefore the economic growth rate, are far too low to do anything by way of substantive job creation. As a consequence, the vast lifts in living standards and the doubling of people in employment that South Africa saw in its first 15 or so years after 1994, and the consequences of which were seen in that 2004 election number, have been reversed.

On top of that, the latest data suggest that the ANC has now additionally become trapped between two issues, which are serving as accelerants for that decline.

The first is Phala Phala. President Cyril Ramaphosa's reputation has been severely damaged by the affair and the steady stream of revelations before the Madlanga Commission has compounded that damage. The polling finds that 44.0% of likely voters believe he is guilty of a crime, compared to only 12.0% who believe he is innocent. Even among ANC voters, significantly more, 37%, believe he is guilty than the percentage who believe he is innocent, 29%. Around 80.0% of South Africans believe that, if found guilty either by Parliament or a court, he should be removed from office.

Those are devastating numbers for a party whose hopes of recovery under Ramaphosa rested heavily on the idea that he represented reform and a break with corruption.

The second issue is immigration.

Public concern over migration has risen sharply. Around two thirds of voters believe both that foreigners are why the unemployment rate is so high and that communities would be within their rights to take the law into their own hands and expel migrants. Parties that have campaigned prominently on migration appear to be benefiting, while the ANC finds itself squeezed between growing public anger and its own inability to respond decisively.

These two issues reinforce one another. Phala Phala dilutes the distinction that many voters once drew between Ramaphosa and former President Jacob Zuma. Increasingly they think both are crooks. At the same time, the ANC has no answers on jobs because it rejects the requisite reforms, and no answers on migrants because it is impossible to expel them, and even if the government did, that would do nothing to address the jobs problem.

The party cannot therefore reverse either perception. It cannot readily restore confidence around Phala Phala without Ramaphosa publicly testifying on the allegations against him, but, under cross-examination, his testimony is likely to make things a lot worse than they already are. Nor can it address public anger over migration without faster economic growth, yet it remains resistant to many of the reforms required to achieve that.

There is also persistent chatter of an orchestrated “third-force” campaign designed to squeeze the ANC simultaneously on the Phala Phala and migration fronts. To the extent that this is true, it is proving effective in accelerating the ANC’s decline.

The major metro data show the extent of that.

In Johannesburg and eThekwini, the ANC is polling below or at 20%. In Tshwane it is just above 30%.

The implication is that South Africa continues to move deeper into a fragmented political era in which no single party appears capable of exercising control over the state or the government. The metropolitan councils remain on course for further coalition governments, although it is premature to be sure of that for Johannesburg and Tshwane – where the DA needs to close gaps of between seven to eight points to take control.

The implications for the GNU are complicated – and likely cut both ways.

Advocates for the ANC/DA coalition will argue that the latest data show the importance of consolidating that agreement – even though the poll data show that in practice this has done little to hold, let alone lift, political support for the joint DA/ANC relative to the collective tally those parties won in May 2024. But its adversaries, who argue for the ANC/MK/EFF coalition, will say the data support their alternative – even though in Johannesburg, where that coalition is in operation, the ANC’s losses have been very steep.

What that goes to show is that the formula of the GNU is not the thing that matters, but rather what it does. In the absence of reforms that raise the investment rate, and hence the growth rate, jobs will not be created and, in that environment, populist frustrations will continue to rise and the country will continue to fragment into the enclave future around which this newspaper has done so much pioneering thinking.

* The Social Research Foundation’s Q2 2026 Market Survey was conducted in conjunction with The Common Sense and carried out by Victory Research among 2 214 registered voters between 8 and 31 July 2026 using telephonic CATI interviews. National results are based on the full sample of 2 214 respondents. Metro results are based on samples of 504 respondents in Johannesburg, 508 in Tshwane, and 500 in eThekwini. A single frame random digit dialling design was used, drawing from all possible South African mobile numbers to ensure that every number had an equal probability of selection. National SIM card penetration exceeds 250.0%, more than 90.0% of adults own a phone, and mobile networks cover 99.8% of the population, providing universal practical coverage. The samples were fully weighted to match the relevant registered voter populations across all key demographics, including language, age, race, gender, education, income, and urban or rural location. Turnout modelling assigned each respondent a probability of voting based on questions measuring their likelihood of participation, with the primary turnout model set at 56.0%. The national results carry a margin of error of 2.1% at a 95.0% confidence level, while the Johannesburg, Tshwane, and eThekwini results each carry a margin of error of 4.4%. The survey has a design effect of 3.7938.