For most South Africans, Colombia conjures up images of Shakira (and her 2010 Football World Cup song Waka Waka), coffee and, thanks to Netflix, Pablo Escobar. Fewer people realise that one of the country's biggest exports to South Africa wasn't a celebrity or a television series, but an idea. Johannesburg's Rea Vaya and Cape Town's MyCiTi bus systems were heavily inspired by Bogotá's pioneering TransMilenio network, which transformed urban transport and became a model for cities around the world.

But there is another Colombian export that South Africans will have to do without soon: the impact of its foreign policy.

For much of the three decades since South Africa and Colombia established diplomatic relations in 1994, relations between the two countries were cordial but relatively limited. Geographic distance, modest trade, and different regional priorities meant they never developed into particularly close strategic partners. While the two countries cooperated in multilateral forums and concluded a number of technical agreements, high-level political engagement was infrequent.

South Africa focused primarily on Africa and the Global South, while Colombia's diplomatic attention remained centred on Latin America and the United States (US). Despite both countries emerging from periods of profound political transition during the 1990s, they largely occupied different diplomatic worlds.

That changed only in recent years, not because of economics, but because of ideology.

Opposition to Israel

Under its former left-wing president Gustavo Petro, Colombia made opposition to Israel a defining feature of its foreign policy and found in Pretoria a government pursuing many of the same objectives. The result was increasingly close diplomatic cooperation, culminating in the establishment of the Hague Group in January 2025, where South Africa and Colombia emerged as the coalition's principal driving forces. Other members include Belize, Bolivia, Cuba, Honduras, Malaysia, Namibia, and Senegal.

The contrast with the previous three decades was remarkable. Within the space of a few months, South Africa and Colombia developed one of the closest bilateral political relationships either country had enjoyed outside their respective regions.

One could think of the Hague Group as being the diplomatic equivalent of the BRICS+ economics partnership. It is essentially an attempt to reshape the global international liberal order by placing their governments at the centre of an international coalition dedicated to coordinating legal and diplomatic action against Israel and countries that support it. Colombia subsequently formally intervened in support of South Africa's case before the International Court of Justice, while the two governments repeatedly aligned their positions at the United Nations and other multilateral forums.

That partnership now appears to be coming to an end.

Turning Point

The turning point came with Colombia's presidential election. Earlier this month, Colombians elected Abelardo de la Espriella on a centre-right platform that promised to reverse many of Gustavo Petro's signature policies. His victory was widely seen as a rejection of Petro's left-wing project, much as Javier Milei's election in Argentina represented a rejection of Peronism.

After four years of slowing economic growth, rising insecurity, and growing public frustration, voters backed De la Espriella's promise to restore law and order, reduce the size of government, revive Colombia's oil and gas sector, cut taxes to encourage investment, and rebuild the country's relationship with the US - and his campaign also received the endorsement of US President Donald Trump.

Security lay at the heart of his campaign. De la Espriella argued that Petro's policy of negotiating with armed groups had emboldened criminal organisations while ordinary Colombians became less safe. He pledged to end talks with the left-wing militia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and other armed organisations that refused to disarm, intensify military operations against guerrilla movements and drug cartels and restore Colombia's reputation as one of the US's closest partners in combatting organised crime and narcotics trafficking.

Colombia's election is not taking place in isolation. It forms part of a broader political shift that has been gathering momentum across Latin America. Javier Milei's victory in Argentina, Daniel Noboa's re-election in Ecuador, and José Raúl Mulino's victory in Panama all reflect growing public frustration with economic stagnation, organised crime, and the legacy of the region's "Pink Tide" governments. Across the region, voters have increasingly prioritised economic reform, security, and closer ties with the US over ideological foreign policy.

The geopolitical consequences are already becoming visible. Argentina has become Israel's closest partner in Latin America, dramatically expanding political, economic, and security cooperation under Milei. Following the collapse of Nicolás Maduro's regime, Israel has also begun rebuilding official relations with Venezuela's new authorities, including renewed defence and security engagement that would have been almost unimaginable only a short time ago. Colombia's election should therefore be seen as part of a much broader regional realignment rather than an isolated political event.

Key

Foreign policy was key to De la Espriella's campaign, and he argued that Petro had allowed ideology to dictate Colombia's international relationships at the expense of Colombia's national interests. One of his first major foreign policy announcements was that Colombia would close its embassy in Pretoria as part of a wider restructuring of Colombia's diplomatic network. His government has also committed itself to restoring diplomatic relations with Israel, rebuilding security cooperation, relocating Colombia's embassy to Jerusalem, abandoning Petro's plans to open an embassy to the Palestinians, and withdrawing Colombia's intervention in support of South Africa's case before the International Court of Justice.

Once the ideological glue disappeared, there was relatively little holding the South Africa-Colombia relationship together. Given the limited trade between the two countries, reducing diplomatic representation becomes a logical consequence of Colombia's broader strategic realignment.

The irony is that Colombia's anti-Israel policies had already produced an unexpected benefit for South Africa. Under Petro, Colombia halted coal exports to Israel as part of its campaign against the Israeli government. A significant share of those exports shifted to South Africa, which became one of Israel's principal suppliers of thermal coal despite the increasingly strained diplomatic relationship between Pretoria and Jerusalem.

Colombia's departure is also significant because of what it means for the Hague Group. Members committed themselves to supporting proceedings before the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court, restricting arms transfers to Israel, preventing military cargo from transiting their ports, and encouraging other governments to adopt similar measures.

The coalition was already showing signs of strain before the election of Colombia’s new leader. Belize withdrew shortly after its formation, reportedly because of concerns about the implications for its relationship with the incoming Trump administration. Bolivia and Honduras later announced that they too would leave the grouping. But Colombia's reversal is of an entirely different order.

Unlike Belize, Bolivia, and Honduras, Colombia was not a peripheral participant. It was South Africa's co-chair in the initiative, hosted the coalition's first ministerial summit in Bogotá, became one of the principal architects of the campaign, and was Pretoria's closest diplomatic partner on the issue. Losing Colombia therefore represents far more than the departure of another member; it is the first major strategic setback for Pretoria's international campaign against Israel and its attempt to reshape global opinion.

More broadly, Colombia serves as a reminder that foreign policy changes when governments change. Alliances built around ideology are often less durable than they appear because they depend on election outcomes rather than enduring national interests. Commercial relationships, security interests, and economic realities usually prove more resilient than political slogans. It is something Pretoria should take note of in the rest of its foreign policy.