A coalition of anti-immigration and civil society groups has declared 30 June as a deadline for undocumented migrants to leave South Africa. The groups have warned that if that deadline is not met, they will proceed with a national shutdown and mass protest campaign.

The prospect has triggered growing concern across the country, with fears that isolated protests could escalate into wider unrest if not carefully managed.

The South African Police Service has placed specialised riot units on standby across the country, while government security structures are monitoring developments closely. President Cyril Ramaphosa has also sought to calm tensions, warning that only authorised government officials may enforce immigration laws and that members of the public should not take matters into their own hands.

The significance of the deadline is not simply the threat of a protest.

Rather, the concern is that the country may once again be approaching a period where several of the conditions that have historically preceded major waves of unrest are beginning to align.

Earlier this month, The Common Sense warned that three factors have frequently been present ahead of significant episodes of violence and instability in South Africa.

The first is economic stress. South Africa continues to face one of the highest unemployment rates in the world, weak economic growth, stagnant living standards, and widespread frustration over the cost of living.

The second is the presence of deliberate incitement, which is occurring at scale both on the ground and through social media channels.

The third is winter itself. Research by The Common Sense has shown how many of South Africa's major episodes of unrest have occurred during the colder months, and it has made the argument that there are sound physiological reasons for this.

Does that make an outbreak of violence inevitable?

Marius Roodt, deputy editor of The Common Sense, says that one difference this time is that the state seems geared to the risks. In 2008, 2015, and 2021 there was considerable denial within state circles that there was any problem at all. This time there is acknowledgment that there is a problem and an extreme degree of risk, which will allow the security forces of the state to act in anticipation, which reduces the extent of the risk facing the country. On the balance of probabilities, therefore, and unless the state’s pre-emptive efforts have been very weak, tension should build towards 30 June, but the moment should pass without a massive detonation on a scale of those experienced in 2008, 2015, and 2021.