DA Faces a Cluster of Political Risks That Could Alter South Africa’s Long-Term Future

A note circulated this week by the advisory firm Frans Cronje Private Clients argues that John Steenhuisen’s decision to opt out of the upcoming Democratic Alliance (DA) leadership race may draw a line under one phase of instability inside the party, but it does not remove the broader political risks now confronting it.

According to the advisory, unease had been building within the DA over Steenhuisen’s handling of the foot-and-mouth outbreak and the extent to which it may have alienated key constituencies, particularly in the agricultural and related sectors. At the same time, the party’s polling trajectory had shown signs of softening. His withdrawal from the leadership contest reduces the likelihood of a direct internal fight centred on his candidacy. However, the firm cautions that the episode has already set in motion a wider chain of political consequences.

The note sketches out what it describes as a cluster of interlinked risks.

The first is the prospect of a fractious leadership battle ahead of and beyond the party’s April conference. Even without Steenhuisen in the race, transitions at the top of major parties are rarely seamless. Competing factions, succession manoeuvring, and public positioning could consume time and political capital at a moment when the DA needs clarity and focus. The consequences would rattle supporters.

Second, Steenhuisen’s continued role in Cabinet remains a live question. If he is perceived by parts of the electorate or within the party as a liability, pressure may mount over his future in the executive. That, in turn, would complicate the DA’s position both inside the Government of National Unity (GNU) and more broadly, raising questions about internal coherence, which would again rattle supporter confidence.

Third, the advisory highlights the electoral calendar. The DA has invested heavily in building momentum around Johannesburg ahead of the upcoming local government elections, which must be held in the next 11 months. An underperformance in that contest would undermine its broader growth narrative. Around Cape Town, meanwhile, recent by-election results in the Western Cape and a broadly flat vote tally have introduced a degree of vulnerability in what has long been the party’s flagship stronghold.

Fourth, and relevant to both the Johannesburg and Cape Town races, is the question of leadership bandwidth. Geordin Hill-Lewis, the mayor of Cape Town and a leading contender to succeed Steenhuisen, may be drawn into national party management at the same time that Cape Town requires sustained executive focus. Simultaneously, Helen Zille, the candidate for mayor of Johannesburg is engaged in a high-stakes political contest in that city. The advisory suggests that divided attention at senior levels could weaken strategic co-ordination.

Overlaying these pressures is the fragility of the GNU itself. A breakdown in relations would alter the political landscape rapidly and open the way to an African National Congress (ANC)-minority government, which is something that senior figures in that party find desirable. The note observes that if the ANC were to excise the DA from the government and unite around a new leadership figure such as Patrice Motsepe, at precisely the same moment that the DA seems divided and underperforming, then the implications for South Africa’s next national government could catch investors banking on an extension of the current unity government off guard.

It is premature, the firm emphasises, to attach precise numbers to this scenario. Yet it argues that if several of these dynamics were to converge, a 2029 national election outcome in which the ANC sits in the mid-40s and the DA falls below 20% becomes plausible. In such a configuration, the ANC could assemble a coalition without relying on the DA, the Economic Freedom Fighters, or uMkhonto weSizwe Party.