The impeachment process against President Cyril Ramaphosa has been paused.

A three-member bench granted the president an interim interdict suspending Parliament’s section 89 committee. The committee was established to investigate whether there is sufficient evidence for Ramaphosa to face an impeachment vote in the National Assembly.

The suspension is not permanent. The process can resume once the same court has heard and ruled on Ramaphosa’s separate review application.

That application challenges the legality of the report the committee was established to investigate. The report was produced in 2022 by an independent panel chaired by retired Chief Justice Sandile Ngcobo, one of South Africa’s most respected jurists.

The panel found that there was prima facie evidence that Ramaphosa may have violated the Constitution and anti-corruption laws and may have committed serious misconduct. Its concerns included the foreign currency kept at the president’s Phala Phala game farm, the failure to report the burglary through normal police channels, the use of state resources in the secret investigation, and the possible conflict between Ramaphosa’s presidential duties and his private farming business. These were preliminary findings rather than a determination of guilt, but the panel concluded that there was enough evidence for Parliament to investigate the matter formally.

Ramaphosa argues that the panel misunderstood its mandate, failed to assess properly whether the evidence before it was admissible, and made findings on matters it had not been asked to consider.

The review will be heard in early September. However, the court may reserve judgement and deliver its ruling later.

The Western Cape High Court took roughly a week to deliver its interdict judgement on 24 July. It is under no obligation to rule from the bench when the review is heard. The impeachment committee’s public work will remain frozen until judgement is delivered.

There are two possible outcomes.

Should Ramaphosa lose, the committee can resume its investigation, call witnesses, and collect evidence.

Should he win, the current section 89 process could be wounded, but would not necessarily collapse.

The reason for the wounding lies in how the committee came into existence. In May, the Constitutional Court ordered that the Ngcobo report be referred to the committee, overturning the National Assembly’s December 2022 decision to reject it.

The committee therefore exists because of that report. Should the report be declared invalid and set aside, the legal foundation for the committee’s inquiry would disappear. Its mandate would fall away and the current impeachment attempt would effectively die.

That would not necessarily close the matter permanently.

A fresh section 89 process could still be initiated. However, that would require a new independent panel, a new report, and a new referral vote. It would restart a process that has already dragged on for close to four years.

The opposition parties that opposed Ramaphosa’s interdict application could also appeal a judgement setting the report aside. These parties include the Economic Freedom Fighters, the uMkhonto weSizwe Party, the African Transformation Movement, and United Africans Transformation.

Ramaphosa would have similar options should he lose the review. He could appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal and, if unsuccessful there, approach the Constitutional Court.

Each appeal would take time and would probably be accompanied by another application to prevent the impeachment committee from continuing its work while the courts consider the matter.

The Common Sense has previously argued that Ramaphosa would present himself publicly as respectful of constitutional processes while using every available legal and procedural mechanism to frustrate and delay the impeachment inquiry.

The interdict and the September review fit that pattern.

The political arithmetic behind the process has not changed. Removing Ramaphosa would require a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly, equal to 267 of its 400 members. The African National Congress (ANC) and its coalition partners are well positioned to prevent that threshold from being reached.

There is however another mechanism to remove him – this is a motion of no confidence, which only needs a simple majority of members of parliament to vote against him. This is an option that the Democratic Alliance (DA) or any other party could trigger, and would probably succeed against Ramaphosa, if it were held under a secret ballot, as ANC dissidents could vote against him.

This is leverage that the DA and other parties hold over Ramaphosa and are able to use to influence his behaviour in the government. The likelihood, therefore, is that he will be allowed to play for time on the impeachment question and remain in office at least until December 2027, when the ANC goes to an electoral conference.