The Two GNU Stress Tests for 2026

Whether South Africa’s Government of National Unity (GNU) endures through 2026 may be determined by two major tests. The first will hinge on whether the Democratic Alliance (DA) retains John Steenhuisen as its leader. The second will hinge on campaigning around the local government elections.

The first test comes early, with the DA leadership election. The DA has been a central pillar of the GNU, both because it supplies governing capacity and because its participation reassures voters and investors who want policy restraint and administrative improvement. Under John Steenhuisen, the party’s approach has been to treat the coalition as a platform for incremental reform, even at the cost of compromise and slow progress. That posture has helped keep the coalition functional through predictable disputes.

A leadership outcome that weakens or removes Steenhuisen could change that posture. The DA is not united on its participation in the GNU or the terms of that participation. A new leader, or a leadership faction with a different reading of the party’s incentives, may decide the DA benefits more from sharper differentiation than from coalition discipline. That can play out in several ways, even without any formal exit. The DA could harden its negotiating lines, escalate disagreements into public confrontation, or adopt a more transactional approach that makes day-to-day governance more brittle. That could easily evolve to stack the political deck for an exit.

The second test will build across the year as campaigning accelerates for local government elections expected in late 2026 or early 2027. The municipal contest will force the DA and the African National Congress (ANC) into conflict on the most basic tenets of governance. This will build structural tension inside a unity arrangement, because coalition partners must campaign against one another while still governing together.

For the ANC, the metro campaigns will be especially difficult. In the big cities, the party is exposed to voter anger over failing services, corruption, and the long erosion of municipal capability. The DA, by contrast, has strong openings in all metros where it on balance now out-polls the ANC. Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Port Elizabeth will be the central battlegrounds because they are large, symbolic of which party may lead a future South Africa, and deeply affected by municipal decline.

As those contests sharpen, the incentives of the GNU partners will shift. The ANC will be under pressure to defend its urban footprint and to limit DA advances in the metros. That pressure may push it towards louder rhetoric and defensive positioning, rather than the quieter compromises needed to keep a coalition working. The DA, meanwhile, will want to make the case that it offers an alternative to the ANC in the places where governance failure is most obvious. That requires clarity and contrast, which can collide with the discipline and restraint that coalition management demands, especially if the DA is under new management.

The way in which these two sets of events intersect through 2026 presents the risk equation the GNU will have to try and navigate. Taken together, these two tests will reveal whether the GNU has matured into a durable governing arrangement or remains a temporary alignment of convenience.