Iran's Unrest: Real Grievances Amid a Rigid System and External Shadows

I would like to share a few thoughts on the ongoing protests in Iran that were triggered as a result of inflation.

I visited the country last year and stayed for a month. I am not an Iranian analyst, nor do I have access to special or insider information beyond what my friends and in-laws in the country have shared with me. However, I travel to Iran regularly and have a good sense of the everyday experiences and frustrations of ordinary people there.

First, I am not surprised that unrest has erupted. When I was there in August 2025, it was already clear how devastating the high inflation rate was – then around 45% and now even higher – and how it was hurting middle-class families. For instance, many young people in their 30s were still living with their parents because they simply could not afford to buy or rent property, and there were no signs of improvement on the horizon.

Another major concern weighing on people’s minds is the chronic and worsening water shortage. The situation has become so severe that President Masoud Pezeshkian stated in late 2025 that relocating the capital from Tehran is no longer optional but a necessity, due to the city’s unsustainable water supply.

Rigidity

The political crisis in Iran has multiple layers, and there is no fully honest or straightforward side to it. On one hand, the Iranian system remains rigid and extremely difficult to reform. The Guardian Council wields strong veto power over political candidates, resulting in a form of “representation” that exhibits near-unanimous ideological and theocratic conformity.

The exiled “crown prince”, Reza Pahlavi, draws most of his support from diaspora communities and exile groups. Given his father’s authoritarian rule and the deep resentment toward the monarchy that persists among many Iranians inside the country, he is unlikely to be broadly welcomed back. While his visibility has increased amid the current protests, his actual level of domestic support remains unclear and is often amplified by diaspora voices and pro-Western media outlets.

The lack of viable organised opposition or realistic paths to reform has left the ruling elite increasingly cornered. In 2024, Iran elected a relatively reformist president, Masoud Pezeshkian. Upon taking office, he expressed interest in renegotiating with the West – including reviving nuclear talks to ease sanctions – and has pushed back against strict enforcement of hijab rules, opposing new hardline “chastity” laws.

However, the structures above him – the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, and entrenched institutions – severely limit his ability to enact real change. In addition, the hardline approach by both Israel and the United States (US) has only emboldened the “purists” to make their argument.

Opposition

Genuine opposition inside Iran remains almost nonexistent. Real opponents are either in exile, imprisoned, or heavily suppressed. The 2024 parliamentary elections saw roughly 25 million votes cast (about a 41% turnout), with “pro-regime” Principlist candidates (what would be called “hardliners” in the West) winning the vast majority of seats. Pezeshkian’s presidential victory was possible in part because the Principlists fielded multiple candidates, splitting their vote.

At the time I thought it was a positive development, because it was somewhat reminiscent of how internal conservative divisions in apartheid South Africa eventually opened the door to reform.

That said, the overall administration remains dominated by solid pro-government majorities, reinforcing the status quo despite low turnout and widespread disillusionment.

Western intervention and pressure add another layer to the protest. For example, I do not trust the death toll figures emerging “from Iran”. Outlets such as The Grayzone have pointed out that many of the higher reported numbers originate from NGOs with ties to the National Endowment for Democracy, which is often linked to Central Intelligence Agency operations. At the same time, we cannot ignore the reality of years of strict US sanctions, which have severely depleted foreign reserves and prevented the central bank from stabilising the currency effectively.

Additionally, the current protests are unfolding against the backdrop of last year’s tit-for-tat military exchanges between Israel and Iran, which nearly escalated into a broader conflict before President Donald Trump called for a de-escalations when he said that both Israel and Iran “do not know what the fuck they are doing”.

As things stand, Iran has been under a near-total internet blackout for some time (since early January 2026), severely restricting communication. In my last brief contact with my in-laws, they mentioned that landlines had also been cut in some areas. There are reports that authorities have targeted and disrupted Starlink access, which the government views as a tool of US military influence.

I do not make predictions, but my suspicion is that the government and its intelligence forces have sufficient means to suppress the current wave of protests. They also have enough domestic propaganda tools to frame the unrest as Western-orchestrated intervention – and let’s be honest, the most effective propaganda often contains a kernel of truth.

That said, I feel genuinely sorry for the Iranian people enduring this inflation and hardship and young people, in particular, who took to the streets. Their grievances – economic pain, water scarcity, political stagnation – are real and legitimate, regardless of whether or not the protests are being flamed by external actors.

Hügo Krüger is a writer and YouTube podcaster and regularly writes on energy, geopolitics, climate change, and infrastructure. He holds a MSc in Civil Nuclear Engineering.

This article was originally published on Krüger's Substack.