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Pressure on Geordin Hill-Lewis to save President Cyril Ramaphosa is being applied because Ramaphosa could now viably be turfed out of office on two fronts.

The first is impeachment. That route requires a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. That vote count is plausible at a stretch especially if it takes place by secret ballot. However, Ramaphosa has all sorts of room to stall, delay, obfuscate, litigate, and drag the process out for months – exactly as Jacob Zuma did in the face of the corruption allegations he confronted at the end of his time in office. The second is a straight vote of no confidence. That requires only 50% plus one to succeed. On that terrain, Ramaphosa has far fewer options.

The vote of no confidence is the more dangerous route for him. If it were held by secret ballot, Ramaphosa would almost certainly be removed from office. ANC dissidents who are unwilling to move openly against him would have the cover to do so privately. Opposition parties would have every incentive to support the motion. The presidency could fall not through a long impeachment process, but through a single parliamentary vote.

That makes Hill-Lewis central to South Africa’s immediate political future – as he in practice has the power over whether the no confidence vote goes ahead and succeeds or not.

One option is for Hill-Lewis to protect Ramaphosa in the interests of preventing a government of Paul Mashatile, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), and uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MK). That is what many business and elite actors want. Their view is that Ramaphosa may be weak, compromised, and politically exhausted, but that the alternative could be worse. They fear that removing him could open the door to a more radical African National Congress (ANC) leadership arrangement, possibly dependent on the EFF or MK.

The second option is to allow events to play out, and then vote to remove Ramaphosa if the evidence of wrongdoing is strong enough. If it led to an MK or EFF-aligned government, South Africa would enter a volatile political period. But it would also create a very different electoral landscape – and one the Democratic Alliance (DA) might profit from to become South Africa’s largest political party and lead its government into the 2030s.

Such a scenario of axing Ramaphosa now would deny the ANC the ability to stage an ordered leadership transition. Instead, it would likely collapse into a Mashatile, EFF, and MK arrangement. This would be very unpopular with the South African public and the economic hardship immediately triggered by the coming of such a government would force more voters out of the ANC. The effect would almost certainly grow the DA’s vote share.

But the initial economic fallout is also why the DA hesitates. The party fears that its own voters may punish it for the consequences of removing Ramaphosa. Donors and elite South Africa would be deeply disappointed. Business wants stability, not a high-risk experiment in political acceleration.

The dilemma is made harder by the fact that a small majority of South Africans want Ramaphosa to go. By protecting him, the DA may be seen as protecting the malfeasance and disappointing economic performance that voters have come to resent – and this may stall its growth prospects with voters starting to think it was ultimately no different to Ramaphosa himself.

Protecting Ramaphosa would also reward him despite his efforts to sabotage the DA inside the Government of National Unity and embolden future ANC leaders to continue doing the same on the calculation that the DA was fundamentally too weak exploit opportunities to remove the ANC from office or lead a future coalition government. The DA’s hesitance would also allow the ANC to stage an orderly transition, potentially giving the party time to recover and weakening the DA’s growth prospects.

Hill-Lewis therefore faces a brutal choice. Aligning with elite opinion to save Ramaphosa and preserve short-term stability, or let him fall and accept the risks of a political rupture that may, in the end, benefit the DA most.

At this time the ANC seems fairly certain that the DA will not exploit the opportunity and instead fold to save Ramaphosa and give the ANC another lease on life. Business leaders seem similarly confident. To an extent the DA’s instinct as a cautious organisation may also align with this. But there are pockets of DA thinkers who see the bigger opportunity and who may gain an upper hand to cut Ramaphosa loose. Regardless of what happens it is extraordinary that South Africa’s politics has evolved to a point where the DA holds such power over the ANC in the palm of its hand.