Non-Kinetic Options for Regime Change in Iran

About one week into the fighting between Iran, the United States (US), and Israel, the Islamic Republic regime has sustained considerable damage. The top echelons of its leadership have been wiped out, its ballistic missile infrastructure has been targeted, and elements of its nuclear weapons programme have been struck.

The skies are now entirely controlled by allied forces, which have begun targeting sites associated with the regime’s security apparatus, including the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the on-the-streets enforcers known as the Basij.

Iran has fired missiles at several Arab states in the region and has now added Turkey and Azerbaijan to the list. These actors are becoming increasingly restless and are threatening retaliatory strikes, which has further isolated the regime. Within BRICS, only South Africa and Russia have come to Iran’s defence and China making only perfunctory contributions.

With the apparent success of the campaign so far, attention has begun to shift toward what the endgame of this action might be. Short of the use of nuclear weapons against Japan in 1945, aerial campaigns have rarely created the conditions necessary for effective regime change. That typically requires boots on the ground. Iran, however, is far too large, well populated, and geographically complex for such an option to be feasible, especially with a sceptical public in the US that still remembers the invasion of Iraq.

There have been reports suggesting that armed Kurdish militias might move into parts of the country, but it remains unclear how significant a threat this would pose to the regime. The Trump administration has been remarkably creative in its approaches both to this war and to the short-lived action in Venezuela, so it may still have additional ideas up its sleeve. However, some of Trump’s statements suggest that he might prefer an outcome similar to that in Venezuela, where a severely weakened regime is unable to cross the US’s three major red lines: no nuclear weapons, no ballistic missile development, and no funding of terrorist proxies.

Iran, however, is not Venezuela. It is not in America’s backyard, and it is not run by a group of corrupt communists who see politics primarily in material terms. The Iranian power structure combines an apocalyptic religious ideology with a vast patronage state that captures as much as 50% of the economy. This makes finding a pliant administrator, strong enough to run the country but weak enough to kowtow to a distant Uncle Sam, much more difficult.

Partner

Even if the US does find a partner it can work with, that partner would still need to be kept in line. Ultimately, the best guarantee for an Iran that does not threaten the rest of the world, and its own population of roughly 90 million people, is one in which the Iranian people themselves have a genuine say in the governance of their country.

This is where non-kinetic, or non-violent, options come into play. These tools allow the US and others interested in promoting democracy a path that resembles a marathon rather than a sprint. Despite its large military, the US has a long history of effectively using information warfare and other non-violent tools against adversaries in order to assist democratic activists and keep authoritarian regimes off balance. These tools include targeted sanctions, continuous military deterrence, and support for, but not direct control of, opposition movements.

There is also the issue of information. The US effectively used opposition radio during the Cold War to support West Berlin, and the Reagan administration’s covert support for the Solidarity trade union in communist Poland.

Iran is of particular interest in this regard because its population is generally well educated and less ideologically extreme than many of its neighbours. Iranians also possess a strong national identity that maintains a living memory of a time when the country was more open than it is under the current regime. As a result, many organisations that promote democracy through non-violent means, including the Oslo Freedom Forum, Gene Sharp’s Albert Einstein Institution, and the Middle East Forum, have invested significant effort in democracy information initiatives.

The regime was able to murder tens of thousands of protesting Iranians in December 2025 largely because it was able to shut off the internet and prevent images of the massacres from leaving the country. With only two state-controlled companies managing internet infrastructure, one of which MTN holds a 49% share in, shutting down connectivity is relatively straightforward.

Starlink

One tool that has helped circumvent this restriction is Starlink, through which many of the images and videos of the massacres have reached the outside world. It is estimated that there are already around 50 000 Starlink terminals inside Iran. The regime fears them so much that being caught with one can carry a prison sentence of up to ten years and, in some cases, the death penalty. The regime has even deployed military-grade signal scramblers in an effort to degrade the terminals’ effectiveness.

A concerted effort to smuggle many more terminals into the country, especially if their current high price can be reduced, would open a window into Iranian society that is currently shut tight. Elon Musk’s research into decentralising Starlink connectivity via mobile phones could also significantly expand this capability.

Not everything, however, is digital. The Voice of America (VOA) Persian Service operates radio and satellite broadcasts that provide Iranians with information they would otherwise have to rely on the regime to obtain. Unfortunately, VOA has been badly mismanaged by multiple American administrations.

The Persian service has been accused of bias in favour of the regime, the use of unrelatable anchors and reporters, unnecessary duplication of resources, failure to adapt to digital platforms that reach younger audiences, and becoming a source of bureaucratic bloat associated with too many permanent staff.

When the Trump administration came to power, Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE, instead of reforming the institution, effectively gutted the US Agency for Global Media (USAGM), which oversees VOA and several other American international broadcasting services. Ironically, the first job of the new American ambassador to South Africa, Brent Bozell III, was with USAGM before Musk’s intervention. If the US intends to compete seriously in the information war, restoring the effectiveness of these institutions will be crucial.

Diplomatic isolation is another key tool. Expelling Iranian officials from capitals where their embassies operate as forward bases for intelligence gathering, and for the harassment of Iranians living abroad, would be a start.

Other options

Another step would be using the architecture of the United Nations in an appropriate manner including holding states accountable for atrocities committed against their own citizens. Effective international legal mechanisms also exist to document abuses and to arrest those directly involved in the killing of protesters.

Countries that continue to carry water for the regime should also be publicly identified and challenged in international forums. The Iran Freedom Index, for example, rates countries based on their supportive posture toward democracy in Iran. At the time of writing, South Africa ranks 48 out of 52.

Applied systematically and in an organised way, these interventions can help, over time and especially once the bombing stops, to nudge Iran toward becoming a freer and more open society in which its people can determine their own future.