A Theory of Victory for Ukraine

Greg Mills, Ralph Wooddisse, Eerik-Niiles Kross, and Grahame Wilson

– November 15, 2026

23 min read

Drawing on more than 30 visits to Ukraine, Greg Mills, Ralph Wooddisse, Eerik-Niiles Kross, and Grahame Wilson examine how the country can turn its military resilience, technological innovation, and national determination into victory over Russia, and why achieving a lasting peace will require a clear strategy from Kyiv and its Western allies.
A Theory of Victory for Ukraine
Photo by Carl Court/Getty Images

During more than 30 trips to Ukraine, we have spoken with soldiers, diplomats, entrepreneurs, civil society leaders, aid workers, national and local politicians, factory workers manufacturing drones, carers, former prisoners of war, journalists, and ordinary citizens. We have found a society battered by war but resolute in its determination not to submit to Russian aggression and instead to realise a better future.

But what is a plausible theory of victory for Ukraine? What are the conditions under which the Russian Federation might admit defeat? Kyiv still has to make the case that its own victory would be a triumph for all those who subscribe to international law, protection of liberties, and freedom of choice over the “Putinisation” of politics as an elite preserve.

Ukrainian and Russian negotiators concluded two days of US-facilitated peace talks in Abu Dhabi on Wednesday, 11 November, agreeing to a large-scale prisoner of war exchange while remaining apart on core territorial and security issues.

And still, peace in Ukraine appears elusive, and the war grinds on. Along a front stretching more than 1 250 kilometres, neither side has secured a decisive victory. Ukraine is not losing. But Russia is not winning. And the daily bombardment of Ukrainian cities has done little to break the will of a population that refuses to surrender.

History offers a warning here. Strategic bombing failed to break British resistance in the Second World War, did not destroy German morale as anticipated, and did not compel North Vietnam to abandon its cause. Russia’s assault on Ukrainian cities is following a similarly brutal logic: inflict enough pain and the population will eventually submit. So far, it has achieved the opposite.

Russian casualties have been enormous, reportedly exceeding 1.5 million killed and wounded combined. Yet a political system that glorifies sacrifice can turn human losses into a substitute for strategy. The same is true for Iran, which, by not collapsing, has turned its geography and the valorisation of martyrs into an asymmetrical strength.

From our various visits emerge ten lessons that reach well beyond Ukraine. They concern the future of warfare, the resilience of societies, the limits of technology and, above all, the consequences of having, or lacking, a strategy beyond survival.

1. War is about interests, not just values: Ukraine has too often presented its struggle to the world as a contest between good and evil: a democratic nation defending itself against a larger, brutal aggressor. That is true, but insufficient to mobilise international support over a war now longer in duration than the First World War and Great Patriotic War.

Whatever the levels of donor fatigue, Ukraine’s defence is not simply a charitable cause or a test of Western solidarity. It provides a frontline defence of sovereignty, deterrence and the principle that borders cannot be redrawn by force.

This argument matters particularly in Africa and the wider Global South. Given its focus on its European partners, it is understandable that Ukraine has not done enough to frame its struggle as an anti-imperial one, despite the obvious parallels with the colonial experience. Russia’s attempt to deny a neighbouring nation its sovereign identity should be recognisable to countries whose own histories were shaped by imperial dogma and domination.

An early strategic failure has been to sell Ukraine as a charitable cause when it should also have been presented as a compelling matter of national and international interest. Ukraine has been slow to capitalise on its military and educational contribution to African decolonisation, for example. A perception of Ukraine as a supporter of the Global South’s own historical struggles cannot but help to strengthen its cause among the previously colonised.

Oleksandra Matviichuk reminds us in this regard that “Ukraine’s war against Russian imperialism takes place on the front line of a global battle over how societies should be run to serve their people best”. There are grave risks in undermining democracy in the interests of stability, especially since that is not what Ukrainians have been fighting for. “Democracy and autocracy have their flaws”, notes the Nobel laureate, “but they should never be regarded as equally flawed.” Or, as Eugene Karas, the commander of 413 Unmanned Systems RAID Regiment, puts it: “Ukraine’s greatest advantage is that it looks forward while Russia looks backwards.”

Values inspire and interests mobilise. A durable strategy requires both.

2. There is a difference between a war of choice and a war of existence: For Moscow, this war was a choice. For Kyiv, it is an existential struggle.

That distinction explains much of the disparity in their respective willingness to endure pain. Ukraine is fighting for its independence, identity, and future as a nation. Russia’s leadership is fighting to preserve its imperial pretensions and political credibility.

Geography, history, culture, and language all matter in understanding this conflict. But they do not confer a right to rule another people.

For Ukrainians, the cost of defeat is not simply the loss of territory. It is the potential loss of political freedom, national sovereignty, and the right to determine their own future. This will be keenly and immediately felt under Russian occupation.

“The Russian-Ukrainian war is not solely because of [Vladimir] Putin,” notes Ihor Shyshko, survivor of 802 days of Russian captivity, who we met in Kharkiv. “He has created a generation of people interested in war. All our guards would yell at us that Ukrainians are our slaves, Poland is a colony, and half of Germany was grabbed from them. They only see the US as their real competitor. We need to stop this war in Ukraine; otherwise, Russia will continue to fight with others.” Shyshko lost 50kg during his imprisonment.

This is why assumptions that Ukraine can simply be pressured into surrendering its interests in exchange for peace are so dangerous. They confuse war fatigue with an absence of resolve. It is realistic to expect that, should Kyiv fall, a guerrilla struggle inside Ukraine would ensue on a scale that Europe has not seen since 1945.

A war of existence does not conclude when outsiders have grown tired of it.

3. The mathematics of war has changed: Military history has often been a story of assembling overwhelming superiority: the Allied victory at El Alamein, the invasion of Normandy, the Soviet advance into Nazi Germany, or the concentration of force that underpinned the Powell Doctrine during the first Gulf War.

Numbers, firepower, and logistical superiority still matter. But Ukraine has demonstrated that the cost equation can be radically different.

An inexpensive interceptor can destroy a much more costly drone. A few hundred dollars’ worth of first-person-view drone technology can threaten an armoured vehicle costing millions.

All wars have an implicit aspect of asymmetry, that one side outpowers the other. But the implications of these new technological developments are profound. A military can no longer assume that its most expensive platforms will provide a decisive advantage against an opponent equipped with cheap, expendable, and rapidly replaceable systems.

The contest is increasingly about the cost of producing an effect, not simply the cost of the weapon that produces it. The side that spends the most does not necessarily win. The side that achieves the most with what it spends may have the advantage.

4. Innovation matters as much as invention:  Ukraine’s advantage has not come from inventing every technology it uses. It has come from adapting existing technologies faster, more cheaply, and more effectively than its adversary.

Commercial drones, satellite communications, software, and improvised battlefield systems have been adapted to meet urgent operational needs. Ideas move rapidly from the front line to workshops, factories and command centres, then back to the battlefield. This is innovation under pressure: practical, decentralised, and driven by immediate feedback.

Viktor Andrusiv is an academic, analyst, and soldier. A team from RAND, he reflects, was tasked with describing the battlefield. “They asked how we worked with the ministry. We replied that we don’t. They pay, but we work with the brigades, the commanders on the ground, and that shapes what happens, not the orders and ideas from the top.”

The lesson is that technological sophistication is not enough. What matters is the capacity to experiment, learn, and scale successful ideas before the enemy catches up.

For governments and militaries accustomed to long procurement cycles, rigid hierarchies, and elaborate approval processes, Ukraine offers a sharp rebuke. Innovation cannot be confined to research laboratories or defence-industry conferences. It must become an organisational habit.

5. Integration matters as much as technology: It is not the machines alone that make a difference, but the ability to operate across them.

Drones, missiles, satellites, sensors, and digital command systems do not operate in isolation. Their effectiveness depends on how well they are connected to intelligence, logistics, communications, training, and the decisions of commanders.

Ukraine’s use of systems such as DELTA, alongside other digital tools, illustrates the importance of integrating information and operations. Better situational awareness can help commanders allocate resources, coordinate forces and learn which weapons and tactics are working.

The decisive advantage lies not in any single machine, but in the system that makes the machine useful. This is also why technology does not eliminate the human element of warfare. It raises the premium on judgement, initiative, leadership and the ability to act on imperfect information.

“War has become wider,” says Major Karas, “not narrower with the introduction of drones. Drones do not substitute for other weapons, they simply expand the weapons list. Success is down to how you manage and integrate your resources on a transparent battlefield and how carefully you prepare. Success is still about people sweating it out on the front.” He adds: “People say it is a war of machines, but that is a myth for hipsters.”

The link between the different eras of war is the individual: the men and women who operate the machines, maintain the systems and make decisions under fire.

6. Ukrainian agency has made the difference: Russia’s propaganda has repeatedly portrayed Ukraine as an artificial state, a corrupt non-country supposedly controlled by neo-Nazis and manipulated by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

If that description were true, Ukraine would have collapsed long ago.

Its continued resistance reflects something Moscow fundamentally misunderstood: Ukrainians possess their own political agency, national identity, and determination to decide their future. It is about the Ukrainian people and their own cultural nuances and desire for self-determination.

The contrast with Russia is not simply military. It is organisational and political. Ukraine’s society is more decentralised, with substantial initiative exercised by local authorities, businesses, volunteers, and civil society. Russia’s political system is more hierarchical, concentrating authority in the state and ultimately in the presidency.

Neither description should be romanticised. Ukraine has its own governance problems, corruption risks, and institutional weaknesses. But its ability to mobilise initiative beyond the centre has been a major source of resilience.

A nation is not defined by the claims of its adversary. It is defined, in large part, by the willingness of its people to defend it.

7. Civil society is part of national defence: Ukraine's defence is not the work of its armed forces alone. It is a whole-of-society effort.

Volunteers supply equipment and essential goods. Businesses adapt production. Local communities organise support. Civil society assists displaced families, rehabilitates veterans, and sustains services under attack. Citizens contribute money, time, skills, and ingenuity.

In some cases, military units have depended on locally organised or privately funded assistance to fill urgent gaps, notably the likes of Khartiia, which developed from a few hundred irregular soldiers to a corps-strength National Guard unit within four years. This reflects both the limitations of central provision and the extraordinary capacity of Ukrainian citizens to organise themselves.

Khartiia is not an isolated example. Across the Ukrainian military, small groups of volunteers have repeatedly grown into highly capable formations, often carrying with them a culture of initiative, technical experimentation, and battlefield adaptation that would be difficult to reproduce through a conventional top-down process.

The broader lesson is that modern defence cannot be separated from societal resilience. Military strength depends on the ability of a country to sustain its economy, infrastructure, morale, and political cohesion under pressure.

A state can buy weapons. It cannot buy national solidarity on demand.

For other countries, including those in Africa, this is an important lesson in total defence: security is not simply a matter for the military or the state. It is a shared national responsibility.

8. Peace should not be confused with an absence of fighting: Russia is the largest country on earth, covering more than 17 million square kilometres. Its population density is low by global standards. The suggestion that its aggression is driven by a shortage of land is therefore unconvincing.

This war is not fundamentally about territory, and nor will be its peace.

The issue is not simply the Donbas, Crimea, or the precise line on a future map. It is about power, prestige, and empire: the Russian leadership’s refusal to accept that Ukraine can exist as an independent nation outside Moscow’s control.

Surrendering territory might alter the battlefield, but it would not necessarily change the Kremlin’s broader strategic objectives. Without credible security guarantees, a ceasefire could become merely a pause before renewed aggression.

Nor will negotiations succeed through diplomatic theatre alone. A durable settlement requires clear objectives, credible guarantees, domestic political will and coordinated international pressure on the parties to reach and respect an agreement.

Those conditions remain elusive, not least because the United States and its European partners have too often appeared divided over the objectives and terms of a settlement. Gregory Nemyria, the vice-chair of the Rada’s foreign policy committee reminds of Eduard Bernstein’s expression in this regard: “The movement is everything; the final goal is nothing.”

It is crucial to maintain that option, no matter how tedious the process and obdurate the other side might be. Absent a just peace in Ukraine, the world becomes a more tenuous place for those who ascribe to values of democracy and personal freedoms of choice, expression, and ownership.

Anne Applebaum convincingly challenges the disturbing narrative that Europe should stop arming Ukraine to get peace. “Given that the Russians have never given up their main goal in this war, not some territory in Donbas, the destruction of Ukraine as a state, the removal of Ukraine from the map. So, they would keep going. Ukrainian frontline would break. And then what would happen? Then we would have a guerrilla war on a new scale in Europe. We would have Afghanistan. We would have streams of refugees coming into Europe, as Ukrainian shipping, grain, Ukrainian resources, all these markets are disturbed. We would also have a reinvigorated Russian army on Europe’s borders.”

As a result, Europe would have to dedicate even more to defence, especially given the absence of the Ukrainian army standing between Russia and Europe.

Peace is thus not merely the absence of fighting but a political arrangement capable of preventing the fighting from starting again.

9. Democracy and freedom matter to innovation, and to the outcome: Ukraine’s resistance is also a contest between different political systems.

Its democratic institutions have been strained by martial law, the suspension of elections during wartime, and the extraordinary pressures of national survival. Yet the country retains a pluralistic society in which citizens, local leaders, entrepreneurs, and civil society have demonstrated an ability to organise beyond the state.

That capacity matters militarily. Freedom of initiative, open debate, distributed expertise, and the ability to challenge established assumptions can accelerate innovation.

Authoritarian systems can mobilise resources rapidly, but they can also suppress inconvenient information, reward loyalty over competence, and make strategic errors harder to correct.

The distinction is not absolute: democracies can be dysfunctional, and authoritarian governments can achieve tactical successes. But the long-term capacity to learn, adapt, and hold leaders accountable remains a crucial strategic advantage.

The implications extend well beyond Europe.

Authoritarian leaders elsewhere will draw their own conclusions from the way in which this war concludes. If Putin was to prevail, in Africa, for instance, where ruling elites seek immunity, impunity, and wealth while weakening accountability, this could receive a powerful boost.

If borders can be changed by force, elections hollowed out without consequence and repression rewarded with diplomatic recognition, the damage will not stop at Ukraine’s frontier.

The future of democracy is therefore connected to the outcome of this war.

10. The absence of grand strategy: Herein the most important lesson may be the simplest: military effort without political strategy is not enough.

A grand strategy connects national objectives to the means required to achieve them. It aligns ambition with capability, capability with execution, and short-term decisions with long-term interests.

The value of Ukraine to Europe, in particular, is clear. Ukraine is spilling its own blood and considerable treasure in defence of its own Western ambitions, but also the majority of preferring democracy over authoritarianism from Cape Town to Cabo Verde, and Cape Horn to Caracas. Sixty-five percent of Latin Americans now agree that democracy is better than any other form of government, six points higher than in 2023. The same picture emerges from Africa, where two-thirds of those polled prefer democracy to the autocratic options.

This trajectory and the relationships that make this possible demand a long view. But too often, the Western response to Ukraine has been shaped by immediate political pressures, funding cycles, institutional constraints, and arguments over escalation, rather than by a clear and sustained definition of the desired end state and the route to it. This can only be crafted in clear consultation with Ukraine.

“Our experience should make the West reconsider its doctrines in trying to run the battlefield,” notes Viktor Andrusiv, “If they start after the war, it will cost them a lot. And if they do this now, they will ensure deterrence.”

The Global South, meanwhile, has too often approached the conflict through the lens of diplomatic expediency, selective neutrality, or a transactional relationship with the competing powers, rather than through a consistent defence of sovereignty and opposition to imperial domination.

These shortcomings reflect wider problems in contemporary politics: the rise of populism, a fragmented media environment, shrinking attention spans, and institutions poorly configured for long-term challenges.

And yet grand strategy cannot be outsourced to a machine, a social-media campaign or a succession of short-term political bargains. It requires leaders to define what matters, distinguish the essential from the incidental, accept costs, build coalitions, and remain committed long enough to achieve meaningful results.

Ukraine’s military has, in collaboration with civilian engineers, shown the value of innovation and adaptation. The political challenge is to apply the same discipline to diplomacy, alliance management, economic policy and institutional reform in developing a theory of victory that is both sustainable on the battlefield and achievable beyond it.

The absence of grand strategy has created a gap between what governments say they want and what they are prepared to do. That gap is where adversaries find opportunity.

A Theory of Victory for Ukraine

As Ukraine has moved through its different phases of war, the theory of victory has changed.

Following the full-scale invasion in February 2022, survival of the Russian blitzkrieg was victory in itself. The flow of Western equipment at a much greater scale and the provision of Western intelligence helped to stem the tide and stabilise the front during the rest of the year. By September 2022, Ukraine was in a position to launch a counterattack which led it to regain about half of the territory that had been lost in February to March 2022. Russian territorial occupation went from 7% of Ukraine in January 2022 to a peak of 27% in March, and down again to 18% by the end of 2022.

“The period from the start of 2023 until the middle of that year was probably our most optimistic period since the war had started,” says Andriy Zahorodnyuk, a petroleum sector entrepreneur turned politician, who is now focusing his energies on developing a jet-powered mid-range drone. But by the end of the year, with the failure of the much-hyped Ukrainian counter-offensive, the war began to take on its attritional character, even though there were breakthroughs in effectively destroying Russia’s Black Sea fleet even though Ukraine did not have a conventional navy. Zahorodnyuk headed the Reform Project Office at the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine for two years from 2015, and was appointed as the minister of defence from August 2019 to March 2020.

At the same time, while not a theory of victory, Ukraine pursued a theory of prevalence, as Zahorodnyuk describes, with high-profile (and costly) assaults in stemming the Russian advance around symbolically notable towns, just as Bakhmut had been in 2023. By the end of 2024, the war has become synonymous with the grinding, campaigns to capture Avdiivka, Chasiv Yar, Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, Robotyne, Kostiantynivka, Dobropillia, Kramatorsk, and Sloviansk.

Russia’s theory of victory has remained constant.

Putin’s objective is to bring Ukraine back into Russia’s sphere of influence. This can be achieved, either directly by militarily conquering and annexing Ukraine, or indirectly by installing a Russian proxy in Kyiv. A secondary consideration is to prevent further NATO expansion eastward. To do so, Putin has claimed (falsely) that Ukraine is not, and has never been, an independent country with a distinct culture, history, religion, or language, and that, in Putin’s words, there is no historical basis for “the idea of Ukrainian people as a nation separate from the Russians”.

With regard to his military strategy, in his December 2025 talk at the National Defence Control Centre, Putin remarked, “Our troops are advancing with confidence and grinding down the hostile forces, defeating enemy units, its groups forces and reserves, including so-called elite formations trained in Western centres and equipped with modern foreign weaponry.” The method by which the Russians grind forward is extraordinarily costly, with units inserting themselves in areas having suffered as much as 90% casualties but by surviving, essentially infiltrating areas within the kill zone. What Putin did not refer to was the pace of progress, which in parts of his advance is slower than the Somme in 1916, or less than 80 metres per day. Units in the region of Zaporizhzhia talk of less than 100 metres of advance per week, though all the time the grey zone is expanding outwards in both directions given the prevalence and accuracy of drones.

By 2025, the conflict had become “a full-on drone war”, an attritional conflict which presumably Putin believes he can win because the traditional maths of war of people and conventional equipment are to Russia’s comparative advantage. But absent manoeuvre forces, it is very difficult to restore land. Land is the medium of Russia, and the metrics of success appear to remain focused on capturing small bits of territory on the front whatever the cost and despite the loss of people and the strategic initiative in the rear areas.

Russia’s theory of victory thus incorporates a wider front in sowing discord among the Western alliance, partly by weaponising migrants, supporting right-wing parties, seeding mistrust through propaganda, and putting business deals on the table, while keeping up the pressure on the front and through targeting critical civilian infrastructure in Ukraine’s cities. It’s a slow but opportunistic path fundamentally reliant on the fallibility of Western political personalities.

For Ukraine, the theory of victory remains an existential question. “It’s not about NATO and the Donbas,” says Zahorodnyuk, “but about Ukraine and its existence.” Since you can’t kill every Russian, there needs to be a way to the peace table that is reasonable and fair. And here, optics are important: the perception of who is winning, which places an emphasis on the impact of the deep-strike operations.

Until then, the aim of the war is to remove options from Putin so that he doesn’t have a path to victory any more than Ukraine has a way to lose. This has been accomplished, for instance, in the naval domain, and has been the effect of the war of attrition in place since 2024. Behind this, notes  Zahorodnyuk, is a combination of an existential determination, Ukraine’s horizontal society and the ecosystem which has been established, creating a critical mass. “If you are in Houston, every second person you meet in a bar is in the oil and gas business,” he says. “Building drones now in Ukraine is like doing oil and gas in Houston.”

To extend its own lessons and, in so doing, build diplomatic and commercial partnerships, Ukraine would have to communicate the wider meaning of its struggle, and link that to the experience of others. It has to learn its own lessons as much as others can learn lessons from its knowledge.

Ukraine’s victory depends on the West’s immediate appetite for continued support. For its part, the West needs to decide what outcome it is seeking in Ukraine, what resources it is prepared to commit and what security arrangements would make a settlement sustainable. African governments, to take another example, in turn need to recognise that sovereignty and political independence cannot be defended selectively.

As Adalberto Costa Júnior, the Angolan opposition leader, reminds us, “We are all Ukrainians in this regard, just as all Ukrainians are Africans.” Speaking out and supporting Ukraine is in the interests of African democrats, just as Kyiv should speak out about African authoritarianism.

In fighting Russian imperialism, Ukraine is defending the principle of sovereign choice. It is demonstrating the power of national agency against a much larger adversary. And it is testing whether the international community will uphold the rules it claims to defend.

These are arguments that should resonate well beyond Europe, particularly in Africa, where the legacy of colonialism makes the denial of national agency especially consequential.

But Ukraine cannot assume that others will automatically understand the connection. It must explain it, build relationships, and show why its success matters to countries with different histories, interests, and political priorities.

The same applies to its international supporters. Solidarity is important, but solidarity without strategy is fragile. Military assistance matters, but it must serve a clear political objective. Negotiations matter, but a deal that merely pauses aggression is not necessarily peace.

The central question is not whether Ukraine can endure another winter, another bombardment or another round of political uncertainty. It is whether Ukraine and its partners can translate endurance into a durable strategic outcome.

The lesson for the rest of the world is equally stark.

Authoritarianism advances when democracies lose interest, when institutions lose purpose, and when leaders mistake tactical activity for strategic direction.

Ukraine has demonstrated that a smaller nation can resist a larger power through agency, innovation, societal resilience, and determination.

What remains to be demonstrated is whether its supporters can match that determination with a coherent grand strategy.

The war’s outcome will shape far more than Ukraine’s borders. It will help determine whether the future belongs to sovereign nations and accountable governments, or to those who believe that power gives them the right to decide the fate of others.

Ukraine is not the problem, just as Russia is not the solution. Russia is the problem and Ukraine is part of the solution.

That is why this is not merely Ukraine’s war. It is a test of the international order, and of whether those who claim to defend it are prepared to do so.

Mills is a custodian of the Platform for African Democrats; Wilson is a former commander of the Zimbabwean Special Air Service; Wooddisse is a retired British general, most recently commander of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps; Kross is an Estonian MP and former chief of intelligence. Mills, Kross and Wooddisse are co-authors of the forthcoming War of the Machines (Hurst).

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