Faith Returns to the Centre of Western Society – In South Africa It Never Left

Drawing in part on an article published in Real Clear Politics by Bheki Mahlobo (of The Common Sense) and Joel Kotkin (of Chapman University), a growing body of data indicates that while secularisation remains powerful, a quiet but significant religious restructuring is underway, particularly in the United States (US).

For years the trajectory appeared clear. In Europe, more than half of those under 40 identify with no faith. In America, the number of religiously unaffiliated “Nones” has grown to rival Catholics and evangelical Protestants. Some estimates suggest tens of thousands of churches may close in the coming years. The secular consensus seemed secure.

In South Africa that did not happen to anywhere near the same degree – at least not among black South Africans. A recent report from Stats SA says, “Religion remains deeply embedded in South African society, with most of the population identifying with a faith. Christianity continues to be the dominant religion, with 84.5% of South Africans affiliated. Among black Africans, coloureds and whites, over 85% reported Christian affiliation.”

That report did however warn that “a shift towards secularism is emerging, particularly among white South Africans. A multivariate analysis found that whites were 1.78 times more likely than black Africans to report having no religious affiliation”.

Yet in the West, where that trend to atheism has been so pronounced, recent surveys suggest the tide may be turning.

In the US, Christianity’s decline has slowed, and in some measures stabilised. Younger cohorts are reporting renewed interest in faith. Most strikingly, men are leading the shift. After a quarter-century in which women attended church at higher rates than men, recent data show men reporting equal or greater levels of attendance. Among Gen Z, young men are retaining or adopting Christian identity at rates comparable to, and sometimes exceeding, their female peers.

This gender shift intersects with broader social dynamics. Many young men describe feeling culturally marginalised in progressive secular discourse. Traditional religious communities, particularly Catholic and Orthodox traditions, offer defined roles centred on responsibility, hierarchy, and community. Online platforms have further amplified this trend, with digital spaces making religious narratives accessible to audiences who might never enter a traditional church setting.

The emerging pattern also challenges longstanding secularisation theory. For much of the twentieth century, sociologists assumed higher education would correlate with lower religiosity. That relationship appears to be weakening in the US. Recent large-scale surveys indicate that individuals with graduate degrees report weekly religious attendance at higher rates than those with only high school education. Religion, in this context, is increasingly functioning as an elite marker associated with social stability and community leadership.

Even within intellectual circles once dominated by the assertive New Atheism of the early 2000s, attitudes are shifting. Prominent scientists and technologists have publicly embraced faith. Surveys of scientists across multiple countries show that many do not view religion and science as inherently in conflict. In Silicon Valley, figures in technology and venture capital have spoken openly about their Christian beliefs, suggesting that spiritual inquiry has re-entered elite discourse.

Institutionally, the revival is uneven. Mainline Protestant denominations continue to decline sharply. By contrast, more Orthodox traditions are expanding. Greek Orthodox parishes report surges in converts, particularly among young men. Pentecostalism remains one of the fastest-growing global movements, with especially strong growth in Africa and among immigrant communities. Orthodox Jewish movements are also gaining adherents, even as Reform branches contract.

The social implications are significant. Religious institutions function as engines of social capital and upward mobility. Research shows that poorer individuals are more likely to form cross-class relationships within religious congregations than in schools or workplaces. Faith-based institutions account for a disproportionate share of charitable giving, homelessness services, and volunteer activity. Among young adults, those who identify as religious report significantly higher levels of community engagement than their secular peers.

The broader picture is not one of simple revival but of realignment. Secularisation has not reversed wholesale. Europe remains deeply post-religious. Yet in the US and parts of the developing world, religion appears to be repositioning itself as a stabilising institutional anchor in an era marked by atomisation, declining marriage and parenthood, and political fragmentation.

If the twentieth century was defined by religion’s retreat from public life in advanced economies, the 2020s may instead be marked by its restructuring. The evidence suggests not a return to the old religious order, but the emergence of a new one, shaped by digital networks, demographic change, and the search for meaning in an increasingly fluid social landscape.