Reports from Washington are that the administration there is set to persist with its blockade of the Strait of Hormuz in the hope that the ensuing pressure will force Iran to come to terms.

The Common Sense reported earlier this week that the Iranians had put a peace plan to the Americans that put "the cart before the horse" in insisting on an effective United States (US) withdrawal and the re-opening of Hormuz before nuclear talks could begin.

The Americans are, however, likely to conclude that nothing that is not agreed before the end of the war and opening of Hormuz will ever be agreed.

In the early stages of the war The Common Sense reported that a nearer-term exit point to the conflict was more likely than a long, drawn-out ground war that drove oil prices well beyond their inflation adjusted long-term averages and held them there for an extended period. That advice was based on a set of scenarios published by this newspaper.

In all, six scenarios were published including the destructive Scenario Six in which a drawn-out conflict caused a global economic crisis.

Frans Cronje told The Common Sense that "the breakdown in direct talks between Iran and the US has this past week caused us to review carefully our initial advice...certainly an oil price of above US$110 is one that will cause some severe global economic reversals if it is maintained for an extended period of time...however my sense is that it is not yet time to say that scenario six is now the most plausible outcome...I think the pressure both sides are under must still be allowed to do its work and that this may deliver a shorter-term exit".

That pressure works both ways.

Within Iran living conditions are deteriorating rapidly. But talks are made difficult by the fact that civilian officials who may be more open to a deal are in practice vetoed by the hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) whose track record is one of preparedness to inflict terrible suffering on Iran's people. The IRGC likely also calculate that without a nuclear weapon their prospects of achieving any degree of regional hegemony is limited.

In America the November midterms are bearing down on the Trump administration. Losing both the House and the Senate would be an ignominious end for President Donald Trump rendering him somewhat of a lame duck for the remainder of his term in office. While Republican polling remains supportive of the war high gasoline prices and a sense that living costs are not under control may just be the wedge issue that costs him control of both houses of Congress.

The question is which side has the ability to absorb more pain? The answer would seem to be the Iranians.

There are also some longer-term upsides for America in the continuing Hormuz chaos. The Common Sense has reported, for example, on how that chaos is forcing global energy balances of power westwards in the most significant such shift since the formation of Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960 and its oil embargo of 1973.

But while the net effect of the war may end up being to position the US as the undisputed global energy hegemon, and to break Europe's dependency on the Middle East, it is unlikely that the administration would like to pay with the loss of Congress to achieve that.

The Common Sense has also reported on how the squeeze on Chinese oil reserves is more serious than that on America and that a meeting in May between Trump and Xi Jinping is an important horizon to watch in terms of triggering a nearer-term exit point for the war - should China be convinced to lean on Tehran.

In some respects by maintaining the US navy blockade while stopping short of a resumption of hostilities Trump is seeking to split the difference ahead of that Beijing meeting – between a renewed assault on Iranian infrastructure and an exit short of securing the nuclear weapons objective that publicly headlined the justification for the war.

If the Beijing meeting does not deliver a deal and the Iranians dig in on their demands, a final option may be to bomb Iran one more time in an effort to set its economy back far enough that it cannot for a considerable time pose an offensive threat to the Gulf states, Israel, and the broader West. But even that final option is not without risks.

A humanitarian disaster of the type that might be triggered by the bombing of power and water infrastructure could spur a new flood of immigrants into Europe that few European leaders would look forward to receiving – and that would further accelerate what many of them now privately concede is the counterproductive Islamification of European culture.

A point made by some around the American administration is that it is not necessary to know exactly what the outcomes of a war and ensuing pressure campaign such as that being applied to Iran may ultimately be. There is merit to that. Apply the pressure and see what cracks emerge, and then see around those what opportunities can be exploited. The departure of the United Arab Emirates from OPEC and likely long-term uncertainty around Hormuz, and what this will do to European energy policy, is definitely one of those that America will tot up as a win regardless of what happens over the coming weeks.

A second is that even short of a renewed bombing campaign Iran's offensive ability has been set way back.

A third is that China understands better, if it ever had any doubt, that America may be prepared to pursue extreme measures in the pursuit of parity in the Indo-Pacific.

If the stalemate persists and the polls in America fracture against Trump, that may have to be enough.