An Analysis of Why the ANC Lost the 2026 Local Government Elections
Bheki Mahlobo
– November 16, 2026
5 min read

Using more than 30 years of economic and political data, this report explains why the African National Congress (ANC) lost the 2026 local government elections.
The charts show a chain of events linking the performance of South Africa’s economy to the political support enjoyed by the ANC.
The Economy and ANC Support
The first chart shows how business and consumer confidence broadly rose between 1994 and 2008 but weakened thereafter. ANC support, in local government elections, followed the same pattern, rising to 66.0% in 2006 before falling to 31.0% in 2026.

Business confidence is a leading indicator of investment, as it measures how businesses view economic conditions and therefore their willingness to invest. The next chart shows how investment rose between 1994 and 2008, in line with rising confidence levels, but declined thereafter. ANC support rose as investment increased and fell as investment weakened.

Investment, in turn, drives economic growth. The next chart shows how growth strengthened between 1994 and 2008 but slowed sharply thereafter as investment levels declined. ANC support followed much the same pattern.

Economic growth, in turn, determines the rate of job creation. The next chart shows how employment rose strongly between 1994 and 2008, but slowed thereafter. ANC support rose as jobs were created and fell as job creation weakened.

The next chart shows how GDP per person, which follows from the rate of economic growth, rose strongly as growth accelerated between 1994 and 2008, but then stagnated and declined as growth weakened. ANC support, again, followed the same pattern.

Strong economic growth between 1994 and 2008 allowed strong revenue collection (welfare and service delivery expenditure rose rapidly even as debt levels were halved), which in turn enabled some strong service delivery numbers. The next chart shows how the share of households without electricity fell sharply between 1995 and 2008 before the pace of improvement slowed. ANC support, again, followed the same pattern. The trend for electricity delivery is true of every service delivery indicator the ANC has presided over in government.

The next chart shows the same thing, this time how access to piped water and sanitation improved between 1994 and 2008, before progress slowed and piped water access slipped. The now predictable consequence for ANC support is visible in the data.

As growth slowed and the consequences stalled job creation while cutting the funds needed for service delivery, anger at the ANC increased in the form of violent protest actions. That was in a sense the ANC’s final warning that political support was going to be lost at elections. But little was done to improve the investment climate and, as a consequence, ANC support fell in line with rising protest rates. See the chart below that sets out the share of protests that turned violent and ANC support.

Where the ANC’s Voters Went
The next question is where those voters went. The following chart shows how the ANC lost 15.3 percentage points nationally between 2021 and 2026, while the uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MKP) gained 9.8 points, ActionSA 3.4 points, others 3.2 points and the Democratic Alliance (DA) just three points.

This same pattern was particularly pronounced in predominantly black metropolitan voting districts, where the ANC lost 25 percentage points, while the MKP gained 14 points, ActionSA ten points, others 7.5 points, and the DA just five points. That is shown on the chart below.

Political Parties Voter Bases
The above makes sense given that the ANC and the DA command completely different voter bases. The next chart shows that the DA’s support comes from South Africa’s established middle class, while the ANC, MKP, and Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) (and in this election ActionSA – not shown on the chart) draw their support from the aspirant middle class on the urban township fringes (and deeper rural areas). The ANC and DA therefore compete within largely distinct voting markets, while the ANC shares one market with its smaller rivals.

Despite these different bases, ANC and DA voters alike strongly support the idea of cooperation between the two parties, as do the great majority of South Africans. The chart shows that 68.0% of South Africans support an ANC and DA coalition where neither party wins a majority, including 83.0% of ANC voters and majorities across racial groups.

Such a deal would have a stabilising effect given that it would allow the two parties to control 74.2% of South Africa’s municipal councils, representing 158 of 213 councils, and those councils are home to 77.5% of the population, representing 48 million of the country’s 62 million people. See the chart below that sets out this data.

Conclusion
The ANC’s political support rose as South Africa’s economy grew and living standards improved, and fell as economic progress stalled. Most of the support the ANC lost went to its splinter parties and their similar associates. These have captured wards and markets that the ANC once dominated. Recovering that support will require restoring the confidence to investment to growth to job creation cycle that the party presided over until 2008. If that can be done, the party could likely shut the door on its smaller splinter rivals and even regain its national majority given that the balance of the middle class is an insufficiently large voter market to command a national political majority. Should the ANC fail at this, then the road forks. Either the DA, or the DA with some future new political movement of the urban fringes, grinds out a national majority, or South Africa fragments further into a society of middle-class enclaves stockaded within a broadly unstable and low-growth economy.
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