The GNU was Never About Reform for the ANC
The Editorial Board
– November 19, 2026
5 min read

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Understanding why the African National Congress (ANC) is prepared to jettison the Democratic Alliance (DA) from the Government of National Unity (GNU) is aided by recognising that President Cyril Ramaphosa and many in the ANC never principally regarded the GNU as a vehicle for economic reform. Rather, they saw it as an opportunity to undermine, compromise, and ultimately splinter the DA. This is the point that many in business, bewildered that the ANC would contemplate abandoning the GNU, have failed to grasp. They are judging the GNU against its nominal intent to restore economic growth and attract investment while much of the ANC continues to judge it on whether it splinters the DA.
Ramaphosa had bet in 2024 that the GNU could be used to sabotage and compromise the DA with all manner of poisoned chalices, obstructive directors-general, hostile parliamentary committees, and policy decisions that contradicted its principles. The DA would assume responsibility for failing departments without sufficient authority to turn them around. Its ministers would be frustrated, its supporters disillusioned, and its credibility as an alternative government compromised. Its support would splinter off to ActionSA, the Patriotic Alliance (PA), and the Freedom Front Plus (FF+). The DA would emerge small, battered, and bruised, while the ANC would emerge as South Africa’s sole dominant political force, even if it remained short of a majority.
To Ramaphosa and the ANC’s horror, almost exactly the opposite has happened. Rather than splintering, the DA has consolidated its political position. Its national vote share increased only modestly, from 22.0% in 2021 to 24.7% in the November 2026 local government elections, but its support base has not fractured. The ANC, meanwhile, has fragmented, losing substantial support to the uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MKP), ActionSA, and other competitors as its vote collapsed from 46.1% to 31.0% between 2021 and 2026. Across the eight metropolitan municipalities, the DA overtook the ANC as the largest party overall, emerging as the largest party in Johannesburg, Tshwane, Ekurhuleni, and Nelson Mandela Bay, and retaining its majority in Cape Town.
The manner in which the GNU was constructed offers insight into the ANC’s original calculation. During the negotiations in 2024, the DA sought greater control over the appointment and retention of directors-general, recognising that ministerial responsibility meant little if senior officials remained resistant to reform. Ramaphosa refused to surrender his authority over those appointments. The resulting arrangement left DA ministers politically responsible for departmental performance without necessarily possessing the administrative authority to improve it. For an ANC leadership seeking to compromise the DA, this offered the advantage of transferring responsibility for government failure without surrendering effective control over the machinery of government.
The consequences soon became apparent. Basic Education Minister Siviwe Gwarube was handed the Basic Education Laws Amendment (BELA) Act, legislation opposed by the DA because of its provisions affecting school language and admissions policies. Ramaphosa proceeded with its implementation despite the DA’s objections, leaving Gwarube responsible for administering legislation opposed by important sections of her own constituency. She subsequently became embroiled in disputes with her director-general, Mathanzima Mweli, over textbook procurement, accountability measures, and ministerial authority. Mweli was appointed by Ramaphosa and supported by the ANC in countermanding his minister.
The GNU is littered with similar case studies.
Communications and Digital Technologies Minister Solly Malatsi was stonewalled by both Ramaphosa and the ANC-chaired parliamentary committee when he attempted to reform telecommunications regulations to facilitate private investment and the entry of Starlink. Public Works and Infrastructure Minister Dean Macpherson faced entrenched resistance to procurement and property management reforms, culminating in allegations that sensitive communications involving him and his director-general had been unlawfully intercepted. Ramaphosa proceeded with the Expropriation Act in part to foment tensions between the DA and its supporters, who would see the party as weak and ineffective for participating in a government that endorsed such a foolish and destructive policy. The ANC maintained its commitment to National Health Insurance, in part for similar reasons. Ramaphosa’s dismissal of DA Deputy Trade and Industry Minister Andrew Whitfield, on the spurious grounds that he had travelled to America without permission, further illustrated the degree to which the ANC sought to use the GNU to undermine and humiliate the DA.
The political calculation was that DA ministers would either administer policies contrary to their principles, fail to deliver reforms because of bureaucratic resistance, or be accused of destabilising the GNU when they objected. Each outcome carried the aim of damaging the DA’s standing in the eyes of its supporters.
That the calculation failed explains much of the ANC’s present coalition strategy. An ANC-DA agreement at municipal level would align local government with the national GNU, enjoy considerable public support, and create a basis for more stable and reform-minded administrations. Such an arrangement would strengthen the prospects for better service delivery, renewed investor confidence, increased fixed investment, and faster economic growth. Social Research Foundation polling has found that two-thirds of both ANC and DA voters would back this; a very wonderful and good thing. Yet the ANC is prepared to abandon the option because to too much of its mind, the purpose of the GNU remains to undermine the DA, not to fix what is wrong with South Africa.
That thinking is now, by default, forcing the ANC into an alternative arrangement with ActionSA, the MKP, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), the PA, and smaller parties. But this strategy is just as poorly conceived as that of using the GNU to splinter the DA. The parties the ANC now wishes to go into government with compete directly with the ANC for its traditional voters and patronage networks. And, deeper than that, the ANC’s decline is a consequence of economic failure.
South Africa’s economic growth has averaged little more than 1.0% a year over much of the period since 2009, investment has stagnated, and unemployment exceeds 30.0%. The ANC’s local government vote has fallen from 66.0% in 2006 to 31.0% in 2026 because the material circumstances of ordinary South Africans have failed to improve. The alliance that the ANC is now contemplating has no prospect of reversing the parlous state of the economy. That should be the priority, but it is not.
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