Discussions about South African politics in this publication have often focused on two different versions of the Government of National Unity (GNU).

The first emerged after the African National Congress (ANC) lost its parliamentary majority in the 2024 election. Unable to govern alone, it formed a coalition with the Democratic Alliance (DA) and several smaller parties while excluding its two largest rivals, the uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MKP) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). This arrangement has operated primarily at the national level.

The second developed in Gauteng's provincial and municipal governments. There, the ANC has increasingly relied on the EFF and a collection of smaller parties to maintain power. This coalition, often described as the "anti-GNU", displaced the DA-led administration in Tshwane and effectively excluded the DA from governing in Gauteng.

The weaknesses of the anti-GNU are relatively clear. Beyond consolidating political forces with a shared Marxist-Leninist view, it is widely viewed as reinforcing the patronage networks that have contributed to corruption and declining service delivery. Should a similar ANC-EFF arrangement emerge nationally, the consequences for economic stability would likely be severe.

The national GNU presents a far more complicated picture.

On the positive side, it has been remarkably stable. It has encouraged cooperation between parties that would have been considered irreconcilable only a few years ago. Opposition-controlled ministries have, in several cases, performed more effectively than they did under ANC management, offering voters a practical demonstration of what a different government might look like.

The DA has also used its ministerial positions to influence policy debates surrounding issues such as black economic empowerment and economic reform. The ANC's loss of parliamentary dominance has strengthened oversight and accountability, contributing to the removal of several underperforming ministers. The coalition has also altered the budgetary process, most notably when Parliament blocked a proposed VAT increase of two percentage points.

Yet many of the GNU's limitations are equally apparent.

Dominant Partner

The ANC remains the dominant partner and continues to control most of the major portfolios. Consequently, meaningful economic reform has been limited. Growth remains weak, unemployment remains extremely high, and the country's long-term trajectory has changed little.

Many of the ANC's longstanding policy preferences also remain intact. Controversial legislation continues to advance through Parliament, while questionable appointments and executive decisions persist across government. Although the GNU has introduced some accountability, it has done little to alter many of the ANC's underlying political instincts.

This brings us to the other, other GNU: KwaZulu-Natal's Government of Provincial Unity (GPU).

Technically, the GPU represents a provincial extension of the national GNU. In reality, however, it developed under very different political circumstances.

The MKP won approximately 45% of the provincial vote, while the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) secured 18%, the ANC 17%, the DA 13%, and the National Freedom Party (NFP) 0.6%. The EFF performed relatively poorly, reducing its influence within coalition negotiations.

These results created a powerful incentive for the ANC, IFP, DA, and NFP to cooperate despite their profound historical differences. Together, they formed a coalition with a majority of only one seat.

The significance of this achievement should not be underestimated.

Important Economic Centre

While political analysis in South Africa frequently focuses on Gauteng and the Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal remains one of the country's most important economic centres. The 2021 riots also demonstrated that instability in the province can rapidly disrupt national supply chains and damage the broader economy. This is backdrop to a province that historically has had some of South Africa's most destructive political violence and that has claimed tens of thousands of lives, including the outgoing scourge of political assassinations.

Yet principled foes have managed to come together despite these difficult circumstances. The ANC and the IFP were the participants in the violence that preceded the 1994 election. The NFP emerged as a breakaway movement from the IFP and the DA has spent decades positioning itself in direct opposition to the ANC. At the same time, the MKP is frustrated: despite winning almost half of the provincial vote, it remains excluded from government.

Despite these tensions, the coalition has remained both stable and largely free from political violence.

The GPU has also survived significant internal pressures. The NFP formally withdrew from the coalition, yet its representative remained in government, creating an unusual situation where there is a 50/50 split in the legislature but no change in the executive.

The IFP holds the premiership, while the DA controls the finance and public works portfolios. The ANC retains responsibility for the major service-delivery departments, including education, health, transport, and human settlements.

This arrangement has contributed to greater financial discipline and improved accountability across provincial departments and municipalities. However, these gains have not yet translated into a dramatic improvement in administrative performance. Provincial institutions continue to suffer from years of neglect, weak governance, and the consequences of cadre deployment, particularly within departments that remain under ANC control.

Nevertheless, the GPU has been notably free from the factionalism and brinksmanship that has undermined many of the ANC's other coalition experiments.

Broader Lesson

There is also a broader political lesson.

Thirty years after the democratic transition, the balance of political support between parties without a Marxist-Leninist liberation heritage has barely moved and still sits at about 36%. In specific metros, that support is higher and can take a centre-right coalition over the 50% mark. However, in cases where this is not possible, another 15% needs to be found to govern.

The EFF and the MKP, given their attitudes towards constitutionalism, appear to be unlikely coalition partners for such a grouping. At the same time, whenever the ANC enjoys too much power, it repeatedly demonstrates its inability to abandon many of its historical political habits.

The GPU, however, has demonstrated that effective government is possible, even under extremely difficult circumstances, as long as there is a diminished ANC presence, a powerful enough opposition, and a serious external threat.

Such arrangements are undoubtedly easier to manage at the provincial level, where executive authority is more concentrated, than they are at the municipal level. Nevertheless, after the local government elections in November, the KwaZulu-Natal model may yet provide an alternative blueprint for cities and towns where non-Marxist parties are unable to assemble stable coalitions of their own. It may also help set the stage for an approach to the aftermath of the 2029 elections if the ANC continues to shed vote share.