The United States (US) Navy remains the most capable maritime force in the world. But the question is no longer whether it can project power. It is whether it has enough ships, maintenance capacity, and industrial support to keep doing so across multiple theatres over time.

The scale of American naval power has contracted sharply over time. During the Second World War, the US fielded nearly 6 700 ships. Around three decades later, at the height of the Cold War, that number stood at roughly 600 vessels. Today, roughly three decades after the end of the Cold War, the fleet consists of about 290 ships.

That fleet is still expected to cover vast distances. In the Middle East, it helps secure shipping routes through the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. In the Pacific, it operates across an ocean stretching more than 15 000 kilometres from the west coast of the US to East Asia, where it must counter China’s growing naval presence. In Europe, it supports its allies across the Mediterranean and the North Atlantic. Moving a ship from the Middle East to the Western Pacific can take two to three weeks at sea. The fleet is spread across multiple oceans at once.

That creates operational strain. Fewer ships are available to meet the same commitments, so each vessel is deployed more often and for longer periods. A typical deployment can last six to nine months. With fewer ships in rotation, the time between deployments shrinks, leaving less time for maintenance, crew rest, and training.

The maintenance data show how serious this has become. According to a 2020 report by the US Government Accountability Office, the audit body of the US Congress, 75% of major maintenance periods for aircraft carriers and submarines were completed late, with average delays of 113 days for carriers and 225 days for submarines. More recent analysis from the Congressional Budget Office shows that maintenance work can take 20% to 100% longer than planned.

The Navy operates only four public shipyards, all of them government-owned and primarily responsible for maintaining nuclear aircraft carriers and submarines. These yards are old and operating at or near capacity.

The Navy also relies on a limited number of private shipyards for construction and additional repair work, but overall capacity remains constrained. Ships return from deployment needing repairs, but shipyards cannot process them quickly enough. Delays build, vessels remain out of service for longer, and the remaining fleet must operate more intensively, increasing wear and driving further delays.

The deeper problem is industrial. Naval power depends on the ability to build, maintain, and replace ships at scale. Over the past two decades, that capacity has shifted decisively.

In 2000, China produced less than 5% of global shipbuilding output. By the early 2020s, its share had risen to more than 50%. By 2025, it held roughly 62% of the global shipbuilding orderbook, meaning nearly two-thirds of the world’s future commercial ships were scheduled to be built in Chinese yards. The US has moved in the opposite direction. Its share of global shipbuilding fell from 0.33% in 2014 to just 0.11% by 2024.

In real terms, in 2022, US shipyards built just five oceangoing commercial ships. China built 1 794.

The military implications are direct. China’s shipbuilding capacity supports both its commercial fleet and its naval expansion. The People’s Liberation Army Navy now fields more ships than the US Navy, with approximately 351 vessels compared to around 290, and is projected to expand further in the coming decade.

The US industrial base faces its own constraints. Shipbuilding is capital-intensive, labour-intensive, and slow to scale. Workforce shortages are a major bottleneck, with estimates suggesting that more than 140 000 additional skilled workers are required to meet existing submarine production targets. These constraints mean the US cannot rapidly expand its fleet, even if strategic conditions demand it.

A navy is not defined only by the ships it deploys today, but by the system that sustains them over time. That system includes shipyards, labour, supply chains, and industrial capacity. In this respect, the US is operating with a diminished base, while its primary competitor is operating with a growing one.

For decades, global trade relied on the assumption that the US could guarantee the security of the world’s sea lanes. That assumption rested on both naval dominance and industrial capacity.

Both have changed.

The US can still project power at sea, but it no longer has the same capacity to sustain that role over time.