The comment came as an Iranian official said a United States (US) proposal to begin formally concluding the war was under review in Tehran. The proposal takes the form of a memo setting out terms and conditions that both sides would begin to observe in order to bring the conflict to an end.

The core terms relate to Iran’s nuclear programme and the economic pressure Washington has placed on Tehran. Under the proposal, Iran would agree to restrictions on its nuclear programme, including limits on enrichment and inspections.

In return, the United States would progressively release its stranglehold on the Iranian economy. That would range from sanctions relief to easing the Hormuz blockade that has placed severe pressure on Iranian oil flows and global energy markets.

The development fits into the framework first set out by The Common Sense in its original war analysis, which published six scenarios for how the US Iran conflict around the Strait of Hormuz might evolve – and it is useful to review those against the latest developments.

The first was a direct operational solution, in which the US neutralises Iranian missile and mine threats and reopens Hormuz under naval escort. That would restore tanker movement, but only temporarily, because Iran could retaliate against Gulf oil infrastructure, proxy groups could escalate across the region, and Washington could be drawn into a long security commitment.

To some extent that has occurred through Operation Freedom and the pressure of that operation, and the threat it poses to Iranian revenues and sovereignty, has been useful in getting Tehran to consider settling the war.

The second was strategic withdrawal. In this scenario, Washington exits without fully securing Hormuz, handing Iran a win of sorts and alarming US allies such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Israel.

To an extent that is also occurring and Gulf states and Israel have separately expressed concern that the US may exit the Iranian theatre short of fully degrading Iran’s offensive capabilities.

The third was leadership decapitation inside Iran. A new leadership, possibly more pragmatic, could agree to nuclear and missile limits in return for sanctions relief and international recognition. But Iran’s system is resilient, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), hardliners, Hezbollah, and Hamas could resist any settlement.

That has substantively not occurred to date with the IRGC being dominant inside the Iranian administration.

The fourth was controlled de-escalation by Iran. Tehran could allow more oil through Hormuz to reduce pressure on its economy and avoid a wider war, while preserving its ability to disrupt flows later. That would reduce immediate market pressure but would not resolve Iran’s broader regional ambitions.

This is occurring via the mediated talks.

In its original thinking The Common Sense suggested that the confluence of scenarios two and four was the likeliest way that the conflict would play out and the evidence of the past few days would seem to align with that.

The fifth was structural circumvention. Gulf producers could build or expand routes that bypass Hormuz through pipelines and the like. Global buyers would seek alternative oil sources. This would reduce Iran’s long-term leverage, but would take years, require heavy investment, and remain vulnerable to sabotage.

To an extent this is occurring. The UAE split from the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The US is an increasingly dominant energy supplier. China and India have both done well to snap out of their dependency on Hormuz. European leaders better understand the strategic vulnerability of their Hormuz dependency. All of this has applied pressure in Tehran in favour of pursuing scenario four.

The sixth was regional war. If the first five routes failed, the conflict could move into a ground phase involving special forces, militias, and possibly US Marines. Drawing on Robert Pape, the original analysis argued that bombing alone does not bring down regimes, and that regime collapse requires internal fracture and “systemic political disintegration driven by mass defeat.” That would likely mean a longer and more dangerous conflict, with higher oil prices, a stronger dollar, rising interest rates, and market losses.

To date this worst-case scenario has not materialised. Global oil prices have tended to hold their inflation-adjusted averages, global markets have done very well, the dollar has been muted, and global growth forecasts remain sound and in line with their pre-war estimates.

The process of getting to the actual talks that conclude the conflict will be fraught and full of cat and mouse politicking. This newspaper’s sense, published earlier in the week, is that it is useful to think in terms of a new 60-day window for that process to play out. In the relative order of things that is positive as it means that a nearer-term exit point, short of a global economic mess, remains the most probable outcome.