There is a curious contradiction at the heart of South Africa. The country is routinely described, often with considerable justification, as being in a state of political, economic, and institutional decline. Its economic growth has disappointed for well over a decade, unemployment remains extraordinarily high, infrastructure has deteriorated, and public confidence in many of the institutions of government has been badly damaged. The conduct and rhetoric of political leaders, establishment media, and business elites frequently suggest a society divided against itself, in which race, class, and history have left wounds that may never fully heal. Yet beneath this troubled surface exists another South Africa, one that is considerably more moderate, more practical, and more optimistic about its own future than the national political conversation would lead an outside observer to believe. It is that South Africa that The Common Sense was created to champion and strengthen: to give it a home and a platform from which a great South Africa can be built.

That distinction between South Africa’s people and its establishment institutions matters enormously, because it suggests that the country’s present difficulties are not necessarily the product of some fundamental defect in South African society. Rather, they arise to a considerable extent from the failure of those institutions and the governing ideas they promote to reflect the values, ambitions, and practical instincts of the people they are supposed to serve. It also suggests that the pessimism which has come to dominate so much commentary about the country may be overlooking some of the most important forces that will determine its future.

The argument for optimism about South Africa begins, therefore, with an assessment of its people over its establishment elites, and with an appreciation of the considerable distance that has opened between the aspirations of ordinary South Africans and the priorities of much of the country’s senior leadership.

A Country More Moderate Than Its Politics

Anyone attempting to understand South Africa solely through the statements of its business, media, and political leaders would be forgiven for concluding that the country is trapped in an almost permanent state of the pettiest and most destructive ideological confrontation. Political and economic debate frequently revolves around grievances and blame shifting. The language is often confrontational, and considerable political and media energy is devoted to sustaining divisions that appear to have become central to the identities and electoral strategies of various parties.

Yet the concerns that animate ordinary South Africans are generally much more practical. People want employment, reliable electricity, functioning schools, safer neighbourhoods, affordable housing, and the opportunity to improve the circumstances of their families. They want their children to enjoy lives that are more prosperous and secure than their own, and they want a government that can deliver the basic conditions in which those ambitions might be realised. And they want all that across every line of race, class, politics, socio-economics, and history. And they want that for each other too.

These are hardly revolutionary demands, nor are they particularly ideological ones. They are the ordinary aspirations of people in almost every successful society, and there is good reason to believe that they provide a much stronger foundation for political agreement in South Africa than the daily exchanges between political parties might suggest.

This does not mean that South Africans are indifferent to history, race, inequality, or the injustices that have shaped their country. Those issues remain important. It does mean, however, that the practical requirements of building a better life can create common ground between people whose historical experiences and political identities are very different. A parent struggling to secure a decent education for a child, an entrepreneur confronting the consequences of unreliable municipal services, and a young graduate unable to find employment may disagree about many matters of politics and history, while nevertheless recognising the same fundamental obstacles to their advancement.

The great opportunity for South Africa lies in the possibility that this practical common ground might eventually find a more coherent expression in the country’s politics. The fact that political parties so often fail to articulate it should not be confused with evidence that it does not exist.

The Common Ambitions of a Divided Society

South Africa’s racial divisions are real, but they are not the whole story of how South Africans understand themselves or relate to one another. The country’s history has encouraged the habit of examining almost every question through a racial lens, and its political institutions have frequently reinforced that tendency. Yet everyday life offers numerous examples of cooperation, shared endeavour, and social interaction that do not fit neatly into the categories around which so much public debate is organised. Just consider a report in this newspaper this week that the share of family units that are multiracial has increased very sharply.

In businesses, schools, universities, neighbourhoods, sporting organisations, religious communities, and voluntary associations, South Africans routinely work together to pursue objectives that have little to do with the ideological disputes consuming the political class. These relationships are not always free from tension, and the past continues to influence the opportunities available to the poor. Nevertheless, they demonstrate that the country’s social fabric is considerably more complex, and in important respects more resilient, than the language of permanent racial conflict would suggest.

Perhaps the most important expression of this common ground is the widespread desire for upward mobility. Across racial and cultural communities, South Africans generally understand the importance of education, employment, home ownership, financial security, and the accumulation of assets that can be passed from one generation to the next. The opportunities to achieve these things remain deeply unequal, but the ambitions themselves are recognisable across much of society.

That distinction between unequal circumstances and shared aspirations is fundamental. It means that a political and economic programme capable of expanding employment, improving schools, protecting property, attracting investment, and restoring the performance of public institutions could appeal to a remarkably broad constituency. Such a programme would not resolve every historical grievance or eliminate every social division, but it would speak directly to the practical interests of millions of South Africans whose lives are constrained by the country's weak economic performance.

The political significance of this is considerable. A society in which people fundamentally disagree about the nature of a good life is much more difficult to govern than one in which they share broad ambitions but lack the economic opportunities and institutional arrangements necessary to achieve them. South Africa's problem is arguably closer to the latter, and that creates possibilities for reform which are too easily overlooked.

The Strengths That Politics Has Failed to Destroy

The second great reason for optimism is that South Africa retains an extraordinary reservoir of institutional, commercial, and human capability, much of which has survived despite an increasingly difficult political and economic environment. The country possesses sophisticated financial markets, substantial agricultural and mining industries, internationally competitive businesses, established legal institutions, and a depth of managerial and technical expertise that remains unusual on the African continent – and is much in demand in the world’s most advanced economies. These strengths are too often taken for granted precisely because they have existed for so long, and because attention is understandably directed towards the failures of those parts of the economy and state that have deteriorated most visibly.

It is important to recognise what this means. South Africa is not a country that must create the foundations of a modern economy from nothing. It already possesses many of them, although they have been weakened by insufficient investment, poor policy choices, corruption, and the erosion of state capacity. The significance of this distinction can hardly be overstated, because the economic prospects of a country that has lost much of its institutional competence but retains substantial reserves of expertise are different from those of a country in which such competence never existed.

The response of South Africans to the deterioration of public services provides another reason for taking a more optimistic view. Where the state has failed to maintain infrastructure, secure neighbourhoods, provide dependable electricity, or keep public spaces in good condition, communities and businesses have increasingly organised themselves to perform these functions. Private security, independent electricity generation, neighbourhood improvement organisations, private infrastructure maintenance, and the growing involvement of private operators in activities previously dominated by the state all demonstrate a remarkable determination to prevent the failures of government from becoming the final word on the country’s future.

There are, of course, serious limitations to this process. The ability to purchase alternative services or organise community solutions is unevenly distributed, and the emergence of increasingly self-reliant communities can reinforce existing inequalities. Nevertheless, these developments reveal something important about South African society. There remains a powerful instinct towards organisation, enterprise, cooperation, and practical problem-solving. The people and institutions demonstrating those qualities are themselves among the country’s greatest assets, and their continued efforts provide an important counterweight to the deterioration of the state.

A distinction must also be made between the decline of certain national institutions and the decline of South African capability as a whole. The two are related, but they are not identical. Much of the country’s expertise has migrated from the public sector into private businesses, community organisations, and other independent institutions, where it continues to operate, innovate, and create economic value. A future government that understands the importance of drawing upon that capability, rather than treating it as a rival to political authority, would inherit resources of enormous potential value.

Political Change Creates Possibilities That Did Not Previously Exist

The third reason for optimism arises from the changing structure of South African politics. For much of the democratic period, the country’s political system was dominated by a single party whose historical legitimacy and electoral strength allowed it to retain power despite mounting evidence of poor governance. That arrangement created an unfortunate separation between government performance and political accountability, with voters often finding themselves unable, or unwilling, to impose electoral consequences proportionate to the deterioration in public services and economic opportunities.

That political environment has changed significantly. The loss of the African National Congress’s parliamentary majority in 2024 was a major development in the country’s democratic history, demonstrating that the electoral dominance established in the first democratic election was no longer assured. The subsequent emergence of coalition government at national level, whatever its difficulties, established an important principle. The governing party could no longer assume that it would exercise power without the need to negotiate with other political formations.

The significance of that development extends beyond the fortunes of any particular party. A democracy becomes more responsive when those holding office face a credible possibility of losing it, and when political organisations must compete for support by demonstrating their ability to address the practical concerns of voters. Such competition does not automatically produce good government, and the experience of unstable municipal coalitions offers ample evidence of the risks involved. Nevertheless, it creates opportunities for political renewal that are largely absent from systems in which electoral outcomes are treated as predetermined.

There is also a potentially important relationship between the moderation of the electorate and the fragmentation of the political system. If a substantial portion of South African society is indeed more pragmatic than the rhetoric of its political and establishment media leaders suggests, then the weakening of established party loyalties may create opportunities for new political arrangements that reflect those preferences. These arrangements need not take the form of a single new party or ideological movement. They might instead emerge through coalitions, agreements over particular reforms, changes within existing parties, or a gradual realignment of political competition around the delivery of practical results.

Such a transition will almost certainly be untidy. Political parties that lose support do not necessarily respond by moderating their positions, and some may seek to recover electoral ground through more confrontational rhetoric. Coalition governments can become arenas for bargaining over offices and resources rather than instruments for improving governance. It would therefore be a mistake to assume that political fragmentation must inevitably deliver better outcomes. Yet it would be an equally serious mistake to conclude that the decline of a previously dominant political order represents only a danger, because it also opens political possibilities that were previously difficult to imagine.

The most promising of these is the prospect that South African politics might gradually become more closely aligned with the economic and social interests of ordinary citizens. For that to happen, political leaders, wealthy elites, and the media would need to recognise that there is a substantial constituency for growth, employment, public safety, competent administration, and cooperation across historical divides. The existence of such a constituency does not guarantee that it will find effective political representation, but it creates the conditions in which a different and potentially more successful kind of politics could develop.

A Country Whose Decline Is Not Inevitable

The fourth and perhaps most important argument for optimism is that South Africa’s economic difficulties are not immutable features of its national character or geography. They are substantially the consequences of decisions about economic policy, investment, regulation, public administration, and the relationship between the state and the private sector. Decisions can be changed, institutions can be reformed, and economic incentives can be adjusted. None of these processes is easy, particularly where deeply entrenched political and economic interests benefit from existing arrangements, but the fact that outcomes are shaped by policy leaves room for a future that differs materially from the recent past.

The history of South Africa’s economy demonstrates that the country is capable of achieving considerably stronger performance than it has managed over the past decade. During the first 15 years of democracy, economic growth strengthened, investment increased, government finances improved, and the country experienced a substantial expansion of household incomes and access to consumer goods and services. These gains were uneven and left many serious structural problems unresolved, but they established that economic progress was possible within South Africa’s democratic and institutional framework. Over that same 15 years the murder rate halved, as did the level of violent protest action.

The subsequent deterioration was therefore neither inevitable nor evidence that the country lacks the underlying capacity for growth. It reflected, among other factors, weakening confidence, deteriorating infrastructure, poor administration, constraints on investment, and policy choices, again of elites, that made it increasingly difficult for the economy to expand or for people to find work. South Africa’s fixed investment rate, one of the most important indicators of confidence in the country’s future, fell from near 22% of GDP in 2008 to under 14% today. An economy investing so little in its future productive capacity cannot reasonably expect to generate the growth and employment required to transform the circumstances of its people.

This provides a useful way of understanding the relationship between South Africa’s present troubles and its future potential. Restoring stronger growth would require a sustained recovery in investment, improvements in infrastructure, greater regulatory certainty, more effective public institutions, and a policy environment that encourages businesses to expand their operations. These requirements are demanding, but they are not mysterious. Other countries have implemented comparable reforms, and South Africa itself has demonstrated elements of the necessary capability in the past.

The more difficult obstacle to progress lies in South Africa’s media, its politics, and elite institutions – rather than technical processes and decisions. It lies in the willingness of those exercising power and shaping opinion to get over their petty squabbling and divisive politics and to place the long-term interests of the country above the benefits accruing to established constituencies.

It is precisely here that the moderation and pragmatism of ordinary South Africans become so important. A country whose people were overwhelmingly hostile to private enterprise, economic reform, investment, or cooperation across racial lines would face a far more formidable barrier to recovery. If, however, the public broadly understands the importance of jobs, investment, growth, and functioning institutions, then the social foundations for a different economic settlement may already exist. The challenge would be to bring the country’s governing arrangements into closer alignment with those aspirations.

The Greatest Asset Is the South African People

The fifth argument brings the others together. South Africa’s most important long-term advantage may lie neither in its mineral wealth nor in its established industries, but in the character and aspirations of its people. This is not a sentimental argument that South Africans are somehow immune to the divisions, prejudices, and political temptations found in other societies. Nor is it an attempt to minimise the very real social consequences of poverty, unemployment, crime, and inequality. Rather, it is a recognition that societies are ultimately shaped by what large numbers of ordinary people want for themselves and their children, and by the choices they make in pursuit of those ambitions.

Despite the extraordinary difficulties that millions of South Africans confront, there remains a powerful desire for progress. Families invest in education even when the public school system disappoints them. Entrepreneurs establish businesses in communities where infrastructure and public services are unreliable. Workers travel considerable distances in search of employment, often at significant personal expense. Communities organise to protect themselves and improve their surroundings, while businesses continue to invest, innovate, and trade in circumstances that are frequently less favourable than those enjoyed by their international competitors.

These everyday decisions are among the clearest expressions of confidence in the possibility of a better future, even when the people making them are deeply dissatisfied with the present. They reveal a society in which the appetite for advancement has survived a prolonged period of disappointment, and in which large numbers of people continue to believe that effort, education, enterprise, and cooperation can improve their circumstances.

The danger is that persistent economic stagnation may eventually undermine those instincts. A society cannot indefinitely sustain widespread optimism when opportunities remain so severely constrained, and there is a risk that frustration will be channelled into increasingly radical political movements or deeper divisions between communities. Moderation is a valuable national asset, but it should not be mistaken for an inexhaustible resource. It must ultimately be rewarded through material improvements in people’s lives, and particularly through an expansion of employment opportunities for those who have been excluded from the formal economy.

There is a tendency in political commentary to regard pessimism as a mark of sophistication and optimism as evidence of naivety. In South Africa, where the evidence of failure is abundant, that temptation is particularly strong. Yet a serious assessment of the country’s future requires attention to its strengths as well as its weaknesses, and to the possibilities created by political and economic change as well as the dangers.

The central reason for retaining confidence in South Africa is that its political failures have not extinguished the practical ambitions of its people, nor have they destroyed the institutions, skills, and commercial capabilities upon which a more successful future could be built. The country retains the foundations of a substantially better political and economic order, even if its present leadership has struggled to make effective use of them.

Perhaps the most consequential question facing South Africa over the next decade is therefore whether its politics will finally begin to resemble its people more closely. A society whose citizens largely seek peace, prosperity, security, opportunity, and cooperation should be capable of producing a political system that places those objectives at the centre of government.

The case for optimism, the foundational underpinning of The Common Sense, rests on the conviction that the aspirations of ordinary South Africans remain a stronger and more durable force than the failures of the political and economic establishment. Those aspirations have survived decades of disappointment, and they continue to find expression in the determination of individuals, families, businesses, and communities to build better lives – and it is to give a voice to this, to bring it to the fore, to unite the common ground, and to thereby build a great South Africa that The Common Sense was created.