Today, 6 November, the verdict on the treason charges against the Tanzanian opposition leader Tundu Lissu will be delivered. It will be a judgement on the presidency of  Samia Suluhu Hassan more than Lissu. And it serves as a judgement too of her remaining international supporters, including the more active (such as China and some Western donors) and passive (including the Trump administration, which has refused to denounce her political regime).

The prosecution of Lissu in Tanzania and Kizza Besigye in Uganda, both on trumped-up treason charges and before courts that make a mockery of the rule of law, must be understood against a wider deterioration in Africa's democratic environment. These are not simply cases of opposition politicians facing criminal charges. They concern the changing balance between authoritarian power and democratic accountability, and whether African governments believe they can suppress political opposition without paying an international price.

The democratic retreat from Africa, with the notable exception of deal-making on critical minerals, by the United States (US) under Donald Trump has contributed to this changing environment. It has not caused Africa’s democratic difficulties, many of which have deep domestic roots, but it has removed an important source of external support and weakened the expectation that democratic backsliding will attract sustained international attention.

And yet it is ironic that the verdict on Africa’s most prominent treason trial since Rivonia is being delivered the very week that American voters gave a resounding wake-up call to Trump’s Republican Party in the midterm elections, turning both the Senate and House to the control of Democrats.

Far-Reaching Consequences

The Trump administration's dismantling of much of USAID and termination of the overwhelming majority of its foreign assistance contracts have had consequences extending well beyond humanitarian programmes.

American assistance supported not only health, food security and development, but also the institutional infrastructure of democracy: election monitoring, independent media, civic education, anticorruption initiatives, human-rights organisations, legal assistance, and civil society.

The administration terminated more than 90% of USAID foreign assistance contracts, representing approximately $60 billion in funding. Democracy and governance programmes were among the casualties.

The consequences are both practical and political. Organisations monitoring elections, documenting abuses, and supporting independent journalism have lost funding, personnel, and operational capacity. In countries where democratic institutions are already weak, these organisations provide an important counterweight to executive power.

Politically, the withdrawal sends a message. Governments contemplating restrictions on opposition parties, independent media, and civil society have less reason to anticipate a sustained American response.

This does not mean that African democracy depends on American money. But external support helps protect the space in which domestic democratic forces operate. Its removal makes an already difficult struggle harder.

The most consequential loss may not be financial but political: the retreat of American leadership as a defender, however inconsistently and sometimes unenthusiastically, of democratic institutions and constitutional government.

Under Trump, American foreign policy has increasingly emphasised transactional relationships: trade, minerals, strategic access, migration, and security cooperation,, and, in return, we will not scrutinise your domestic record too closely.

While there is nothing inherently wrong with Washington pursuing American economic and security interests in Africa (since that is what the Chinese, among other countries, do, brazenly), the difficulty arises when these interests become detached from questions of governance and political accountability, and when individuals are picked to profit from such transactions.

African governments may conclude that access to minerals, ports, and military facilities matters more to Washington than how they treat their citizens.

The danger is that political legitimacy becomes less important than remaining in power and delivering strategic advantages to external partners.

Conflict

Recent research has found that African regions more exposed to USAID funding experienced increased conflict following its withdrawal. There is an estimated 6.5% greater probability of conflict in more aid-exposed regions.

The irony is that democratic institutions are not merely a moral luxury. They are important foundations of long-term stability, economic confidence and accountable government. The empirical correlation between sustained growth and improved democratic conditions in Africa bears out this alignment, contrary to the “benign dictator” thesis.

The case against Tundu Lissu is particularly significant because of the nature of the allegations and the political circumstances surrounding his arrest in April 2025.

Lissu is chairman of CHADEMA, Tanzania’s principal opposition party, and a survivor of an assassination attempt in September 2017. He was shot not fewer than 16 times by an assailant who has unsurprisingly never been brought to justice. Lissu was arrested after advocating electoral reforms under the party’s “No Reforms, No Election” campaign. He was charged with treason, a capital offence carrying the possibility of the death penalty.

The prosecution centres on statements allegedly calling for the public to prevent or disrupt the October 2025 elections. The defence has argued that such statements constituted political advocacy rather than an attempt to overthrow the government.

There are serious questions about the fairness of the proceedings. The United Nations (UN) Working Group on Arbitrary Detention concluded in February 2026 that Lissu’s detention was arbitrary and that restrictions on his freedom of expression were grossly disproportionate.

The case also follows Tanzania’s contested October 2025 elections. With Lissu already jailed, major opposition participation was further restricted. The subsequent security crackdown resulted in hundreds of reported deaths, arrests, and communications restrictions. Samia shamelessly, but not surprisingly, was declared the winner with an unbelievable 98% of the vote.

A guilty verdict would have implications far beyond Lissu himself. It would reinforce the dangerous proposition that advocating electoral reform, challenging an election or mobilising peaceful political opposition can constitute treason.

As John Heche, the secretary-general of CHADEMA, has noted: “The conviction of Tundu Lissu on treason charges will send a chilling message to all people in Tanzania that dissent and calling for electoral reforms are no longer legitimate political demands, but rather treasonous acts. It will mean that Tanzanians are no longer entitled to enjoy their political rights guaranteed by the Tanzanian Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. It will further show that the courts in Tanzania decide cases not in accordance with the law, but in accordance with the wishes of those in power.”

We need to be clear on the reasons Tundu Lissu is on trial. He called for basic reforms prior to elections in Tanzania to guarantee fairness. That’s his crime. His expected conviction even after a sham prosecution will mark the darkest day in the region’s democratic process in decades.

Many believed that political persecution was a thing of the past. The region, and farther afield, is being put on notice. Oppositions are under no illusion that the same can happen in their countries.

Is it Catching?

Kenya specifically is at risk of catching this same disease if we are not vigilant in protecting our democracy. There have been attempts by the Ruto regime to create similar circumstances in Kenya, with opposition rallies being broken up by police and party goons. His administration has actively tried to prevent registration of the principal opposition movement as a party, clear signs that he is not averse to anti-democratic practices.

The distinction between legitimate political dissent and an attempt to overthrow a government is fundamental to constitutional democracy. If that distinction disappears, opposition itself becomes a criminal risk.

A conviction would also intensify questions about judicial independence and Tanzania’s compliance with international human-rights obligations. A death sentence would make the international implications considerably more serious.

Uganda’s Kizza Besigye provides an important parallel.

Besigye, a four-time presidential candidate and longstanding opponent of President Yoweri Museveni, was abducted in Nairobi in November 2024 and returned to Uganda. He subsequently faced treason charges.

The case initially proceeded before a military court, despite the defendants being civilians. Following a Supreme Court ruling against military trials of civilians, the authorities pursued the charges in the civilian justice system. The proceedings have subsequently experienced repeated delays.

The cases are not identical, but both raise questions about the use of exceptionally serious criminal charges against opposition leaders in circumstances closely connected to their political activities.

The danger is the normalisation of a political culture in which criminal justice becomes an instrument for managing political competition.

This creates a chilling effect extending beyond the individuals prosecuted. Opposition politicians, journalists, activists and ordinary citizens begin calculating the personal consequences of exercising their constitutional rights.

How to Respond

If Lissu is found guilty, Western governments should resist both treating the verdict as an ordinary judicial matter and imposing a blanket diplomatic or economic rupture. The Democrat wave across America offers an opportunity for a reset in US foreign policy led by Congress. Five responses are appropriate should Lissu be found guilty.

First, Washington, London, the European Union, and other Western nations and donors should condemn such a verdict, particularly in light of the UN findings, and demand respect for Tanzania’s human-rights obligations.

In this regard, second, there should be an unambiguous rejection of any death sentence, which should trigger an immediate and serious diplomatic response. Security assistance, military training and direct government support should be suspended subject to review. Programmes strengthening institutions responsible for repression should be suspended where appropriate, while humanitarian assistance benefiting ordinary Tanzanians should be protected.

The international community should investigate the allegations that government officials gave orders to the judges to find Lissu guilty and secure his jailing. It should call for an investigation into the judges who presided over the case by a team of reputable Commonwealth judges, in line with the Tanzanian Constitution's provisions for judicial officers who violate their oath of office.

If malfeasance is found, targeted sanctions should be rolled out, including visa restrictions and asset freezes against individuals implicated in the election and its aftermath. This should include the judges involved in their case, and their families.

CHADEMA has also requested that, should he be found “guilty” of treason, an immediate hearing of Tundu Lissu’s appeal before the Court of Appeal should occur, and that he should be guaranteed unimpeded legal assistance from his counsel to prepare his appeal in a timely manner and throughout the appeal process.

At the very least, this act would see Tanzania slip further down the democratic rankings of states, adding a further risk premium to those wanting to do business in that country. Businesses inside and outside the country should recognise the risk that their reputations will also be tainted by association with a country in democratic descent.

Democratic restoration should be linked to any improvement in bilateral relations, including addressing arbitrary detention, protecting independent media and allowing CHADEMA and other opposition parties to operate freely.

Tanzania remains an important regional country. Its people should not be punished for the actions of their government. Equally, commercial and strategic interests should not become excuses for ignoring political repression.

But the most important response must come from Africa itself.

One weakness of the continent’s democratic movement has been fragmentation. Political leaders have expressed solidarity in principle but usually in silence, remaining reluctant to confront abuses in neighbouring countries. Hence incumbency rules, at whatever price.

While the African Union, the Southern African Development Community, the East African Community, and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights should treat the Lissu judgement as a continental concern, such alignment is as unlikely as the Commonwealth growing a spine. Under the circumstances, African democrats should focus on showing leadership and taking agency by:

• •Keeping on building a coalition of opposition leaders, former heads of government, parliamentarians, lawyers and civil society organisations to defend constitutional government, as is the case with the Platform for African Democrats;
• •Demanding regional accountability rather than allowing governments to hide behind non-interference;
• •Lending weight to independent media, legal organisations, and election-monitoring institutions;
• •Defending the right of opposition parties everywhere, within and without Africa, to organise and contest elections, regardless of ideological differences; and
• •Developing African funding for democracy initiatives so that their survival does not depend on changing priorities in Washington, London, Brussels, or anywhere else.
• •Africa’s former presidents have a particular responsibility and special role. Their voices resonate, especially if they maintained their own countries’ democratic processes. They should not wait to raise their voices until an opposition leader is sentenced or a country descends into violence.

The Lissu case is ultimately about something bigger than Tanzania. It concerns the future of the democratic compact in Africa: that governments derive legitimacy from the consent of their citizens, elections provide genuine opportunities for political change, and those challenging governments are not automatically enemies of the state.

The decline of American engagement should prompt a reconsideration of who is responsible for defending African democracy. That responsibility cannot be outsourced to Washington, as much as its support would be helpful. African agency has to lead and drive the process.

The strongest argument for democracy in Africa is not that it satisfies Western expectations. It is that accountable government, political competition, independent institutions and the rule of law provide Africans with the means to protect their freedoms and hold their leaders responsible.

A guilty verdict against Lissu today would therefore be a test not only of Tanzania's judiciary, but also of the willingness of Africa’s democratic institutions and political leadership to defend principles that transcend national borders.

Isolation

Outsiders should call out and isolate undemocratic regimes everywhere. Dictators should be under no illusions and must know there is a cost to their actions. Africans are fully aware of the critical role played by the outside world in democratic transitions across the continent. We have to do the same for our Tanzanian brothers and sisters.

This is not only the right thing to do, it is the correct strategic intervention by those whose horizon extends beyond the next mining deal. While Africa is sliding towards greater autocracy, its people want democracy. It will not be long before these autocratic governments are removed or disappear as their ageing leaders vanish.

The key question is whether or not the new generation of leaders will embrace the rule of law and democracy or whether they will merely impose a new form of autocracy once they have taken power.

If the response is silence, other governments will learn that criminalising opposition carries few consequences. If African leaders and responsible international partners respond consistently, the case could become a catalyst for a more serious continental commitment to democratic accountability.

The central question is whether Africa’s democrats are prepared to defend democracy as a principle, including when doing so is politically inconvenient.

Trump’s retreat from Africa and, now, defeat in America, makes that responsibility more urgent. It does not make it any less African.

Sifuna is senator of Nairobi County in Kenya; Mills and Hartley are with the Platform for African Democrats.