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The note examines five data sets on missile strike intensity, domestic American opinion, oil prices, equity markets, and global growth forecasts which it argues all suggest that the doomsday prognosis around the war remains premature.

According to the note:

1. Iranian missile strike levels are down 95% relative to the first week of the war;
2. Republican support for the war remains firm, which has bought Donald Trump further political time. That appears to have mattered in the administration’s decision, announced in his speech this past Wednesday, to continue the campaign;
3. At the same time, oil prices remain within a few points of their inflation adjusted 10-year moving averages;
4. Equity markets are also holding up better than many reports that are not looking at long term data suggest. The S&P 500, for example, remains roughly 16% higher than where it stood a year ago and above its average levels since 2024. And the South African All Share is almost 26% higher; and
5. Global growth forecasts, meanwhile, have not materially broken lower. Recent projections from the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development remain broadly where they stood at the end of 2025. The main exception is the United Kingdom, while the United States (US) growth forecast for 2026 has in fact been revised higher.

For those reasons, the firm says it “continue[s] to urge a sense of perspective on the war”.

Looking ahead its view “remains much the same as it was at the end of week one. Six scenarios are still in play, but two remain the most likely”.

“The first is a strategic withdrawal in which the US exits without fully securing Hormuz…in that scenario, oil prices would likely ease and the US dollar would weaken. The second is a controlled de-escalation in which Iran allows more oil through the Strait…that too would point to gradually lower oil prices and a softer US dollar.”

The other scenarios remain possible, but less likely.

They include a direct operational solution in which the US reopens Hormuz under escort, a leadership change in Tehran followed by a negotiated truce, a longer-term rerouting of Gulf energy exports around Hormuz, and, at the extreme, a much wider regional war.

Of these, only the final scenario points to oil prices remaining far above their inflation adjusted historical averages deep into 2026 and beyond.

As a consequence the firm said, “Our judgement remains that the war is still most likely to end through some combination of strategic withdrawal and controlled de-escalation.”

“That assessment holds even if the US now undertakes a more aggressive campaign against Iranian infrastructure over the next two to three weeks. Such a campaign would likely have two aims. The first would be to force negotiations. The second, if negotiations fail, would be to inflict enough damage on Iran’s economy and infrastructure to constrain its offensive capabilities for years after the war ends.”

The firm advised that two further considerations may also be shaping US thinking on timing.

The first is China.

“China’s economy is more vulnerable than America’s if Hormuz remains compromised and oil prices stay high for longer. Once its bunkered reserves are exhausted, China has no easy substitute for Hormuz-linked supply. We think it may hold around 120 days of reserves. Given weaker growth expectations and the underlying fragilities in its property, corporate, and banking sectors, a prolonged energy shock could create serious pressure quickly. If China is forced to accelerate alternative pipeline routes from the Middle East, that could create new vulnerabilities of its own, because pipelines can be disrupted and dependencies can be exploited. So long as Trump retains political time at home, US losses remain limited, markets hold up, and oil does not break decisively above long-run inflation adjusted norms, the incentive to squeeze China is likely to remain part of Washington’s calculation.”

The second consideration is Europe.

“A prolonged disruption in Hormuz, or permanent question mark over its stability, would increase the incentive for Europe to source more energy through westward pipelines from the Gulf, revive underused or abandoned domestic oil and gas reserves such as the North Sea, and buy more oil and gas from the US. The effect would be to deepen Europe’s dependence on American energy and strengthen US leverage.”

In both cases, the same logic applies. The longer Hormuz remains under pressure, the greater the incentive becomes for America’s allies and partners to shift towards alternative supply lines and energy relationships that increase US influence, support European resilience, and deepen Chinese vulnerability.

That in turn means Washington may believe it can continue to strike Iran very hard, severely degrade its infrastructure, and still exit the theatre without first restoring flows through Hormuz and that such a result would nonetheless see America and its Gulf partners securing the bulk of their original strategic objectives in prosecuting the war.