With South Africans having voted in yesterday’s local government elections, attention now turns to the formation of municipal governments. For the Democratic Alliance (DA), the challenge is not simply to secure as many mayoralties and governing positions as possible, but to ensure that any coalition it enters gives it the authority to govern effectively.

The danger for the DA is what might be called Coalitions in Name Only, or CINOs. These are arrangements in which a party formally participates in government, holds mayoral or other senior positions, and carries much of the responsibility for the administration, but lacks the political authority to implement meaningful reforms.

Such arrangements may deliver the appearance of political progress without producing any improvement in the lives of residents.

The distinction matters particularly for the DA because its political appeal rests heavily on its claim to be a more competent governing alternative to the African National Congress. Its strongest argument to voters is not simply that it offers different political leaders, but that it can administer municipalities more effectively, maintain infrastructure, manage public money responsibly, and improve basic services.

Yet these promises become difficult to fulfil when coalition partners retain the ability to block budgets, frustrate administrative appointments, interfere in procurement, or threaten to collapse the government whenever their interests are challenged.

A DA mayor who cannot appoint a capable municipal management team, reform failing service departments, or implement the party’s programme will struggle to demonstrate why voters should support the DA rather than its competitors. Worse, residents may hold the party responsible for failures over which it exercises little effective control.

This creates an especially dangerous political trap. The DA assumes responsibility for governing while its coalition partners retain sufficient influence to prevent the changes on which the party’s electoral reputation depends. When services continue to fail, the public sees another unsuccessful DA administration rather than the political constraints that prevented it from governing.

The consequences extend beyond a single municipality. A party that repeatedly promises better government but fails to deliver risks undermining the credibility of its broader claim that it is a better alternative.

The answer is not for the DA to reject coalitions altogether. Coalition government is a feature, not a bug, of South Africa’s proportional representation system, and workable agreements between parties with different constituencies may offer the best opportunity to improve struggling municipalities.

But the DA should distinguish between coalitions that make governing possible and those that merely distribute political positions or work as patronage distribution machines.

Before entering any agreement, the party should insist on sufficient authority to implement a clearly defined programme of municipal reform. This should include control over the administrative functions for which it accepts responsibility, merit-based appointments, credible financial management, infrastructure maintenance, and the ability to introduce private-sector participation where municipal service delivery has failed.

There should also be clear consequences when coalition partners obstruct agreed reforms. A coalition agreement without an enforceable programme risks becoming little more than an arrangement for sharing political office.

The DA must also be prepared to remain in opposition where those conditions cannot be secured. Opposition, provided it is conducted effectively, offers the party an opportunity to expose failing administrations, hold governing parties accountable, and build a stronger electoral mandate for the future.

This may be more valuable than accepting positions in a government whose failures will ultimately be associated with the DA itself.

The local elections are therefore not simply a contest over how many municipalities the DA can enter government in. They are a test of whether the party can convert electoral support into demonstrably better government.

The DA’s future will depend less on how many mayoral chains it secures than on whether it can show voters that its participation in government produces better results. If it cannot secure the authority to deliver those results, it should have the discipline to walk away rather than lend its name to another failing administration.